Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors by Liu, Ruonan
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
7-31-2014
Can Compensation Committees Effectively
Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of
Co-opted Directors
Ruonan Liu
Florida International University, ruonan77@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Ruonan, "Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors"
(2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1575.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1575
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
 
CAN COMPENSATION COMMITTEES EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE THE CEO 
HORIZON PROBLEM? THE ROLE OF CO-OPTED DIRECTORS 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
ACCOUNTING 
by 
Ruonan Liu 
 
 
2014 
 
 
 
ii 
To:  Dean David R. Klock     
 College of Business Administration     
 
This dissertation, written by Ruonan Liu, and entitled Can Compensation Committees 
Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors, having 
been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. 
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Abhijit Barua 
 
_______________________________________ 
Qiang Kang 
 
_______________________________________ 
Jonathan Milian 
 
_______________________________________ 
Changjiang Wang 
 
_______________________________________ 
Stephen Lin, Major Professor 
 
 
Date of Defense: July 29, 2014 
 
The dissertation of Ruonan Liu is approved. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
  Dean David R. Klock 
  College of Business Administration 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi 
University Graduate School 
 
 
 
 
Florida International University, 2014 
iii 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
CAN COMPENSATION COMMITTEES EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE THE CEO 
HORIZON PROBLEM? THE ROLE OF CO-OPTED DIRECTORS 
by 
Ruonan Liu 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Stephen Lin, Major Professor 
Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One 
possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that 
discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. 
However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as 
effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, 
because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I 
find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with 
higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals 
management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-
opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less 
discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when 
deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and 
compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the 
CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO 
power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively 
iv 
associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, 
I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have 
more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of 
directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.  
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the separation of ownership and control in corporations, the interests of a 
CEO may deviate from the interests of the corporation’s shareholders. To reduce any 
problems that may arise from this deviation, boards of directors typically act as monitors 
to reduce agency problems. For example, the compensation committee, a subcommittee 
of the board of directors, is responsible for designing CEO compensation packages that 
can align the interests between shareholders and the CEO. However, not all compensation 
committees are equally effective. “Co-opted directors” are defined as the directors 
appointed after a CEO assumes office. CEOs may use their influence over the director 
appointment process to co-opt directors who share some similarities or ties with them. 
Therefore, the co-opted directors are more likely to feel sympathetic to the CEO. In 
addition, the co-opted directors may be less willing to challenge their CEO since they 
believe they owe their board seats to him or her. As a result, the co-opted directors are 
less effective monitors (Coles et al., 2014). This study examines whether compensation 
committees’ effectiveness at mitigating the CEO problem is diminished when the 
majority of the committee is made up by co-opted directors. 
CEOs with earnings-based compensation may focus on boosting firms’ short-term 
performance by cutting R&D spending or engaging in accruals management. However, 
these opportunistic behaviors have a negative effect on a firm’s value. This problem 
becomes more severe in CEOs’ final years prior to retirement, when they are less 
concerned with their reputation in the job market. However, compensation committees 
can adjust CEO compensation to alleviate opportunistic R&D reduction (Cheng, 2004) 
and opportunistic accruals management (Huson et al., 2012). If the co-opted directors are 
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less effective, the compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be less 
responsive to the CEO horizon problem.  
Using a sample of 13,606 firm-year observations for S&P 1500 firms from 1998 
to 2011, I find that CEO compensation is likely to be higher if compensation committees 
are dominated by co-opted directors. I find evidence of R&D reduction and accruals 
management in firms with retiring CEOs and in compensation committees dominated by 
co-opted directors. Further, I find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are 
less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation 
committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. 
My findings are robust to alternative measures of the compensation committee co-
option and additional controls of corporate governance. CEOs’ direct involvement in the 
director nomination process has reduced since 2004, after the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Section 303A, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate 
Governance Rules, section 805 required that nomination committees of listing firms must 
solely consist of independent directors. Despite this reduction in CEO direct involvement, 
I still find evidence that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are 
less effective in reducing CEO compensation and mitigating accruals management when 
CEOs approach retirement in the subsample firm-year observations during the period 
2004-20111.  
I also investigate whether board and compensation committee characteristics are 
associated with CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem using a principal 
                                                            
1 One possibility is that the CEO can still exert indirect influence. Another explanation may be that the 
results are driven by the directors appointed before the year of 2004.  
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components analysis. I find evidence that CEO compensation positively correlates with 
CEO power and busy directors, while negatively correlating with director ownership. In 
addition, I find that both CEO power and director tenure increase the likelihood of R&D 
curtailment when CEOs approach retirement. I also find that the size of the board of 
directors and the compensation committee affect the likelihood of accruals management 
when companies face a CEO horizon problem. 
This study contributes in three ways. First, it reveals that although many 
organizations reduce their CEOs’ direct involvement in the appointment process of new 
directors, co-opted directors are weak monitors. Coles et al. (2014) find evidence that 
board co-option reduces monitoring effectiveness. Since the design of CEO compensation 
packages is delegated to compensation committees, I focus on the role of co-opted 
directors on compensation committees. Second, the study adds empirical evidence to the 
debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Extant literature finds mixed evidence of 
the horizon problem, which may be due to the intervention of compensation committees 
or failure to identify when the horizon problem is the most severe. The results provide 
evidence that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic R&D cutting and income-increasing 
accruals management when compensation committees are less effective. Finally, the 
study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation 
committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem 
by adjusting CEO compensation. Cheng (2004) and Huson et al. (2012) discover that 
compensation committees intervene to mitigate an organization’s CEO horizon problem 
by studying the association between CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem. 
However, these two studies do not directly investigate compensation committees. 
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Moreover, they assume all compensation committee are effective. My findings suggest 
that the effectiveness of compensation committees in mitigating an organization’s CEO 
horizon problem is contingent on the quality of compensation committees. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature 
review; Chapter 3 discusses the hypothesis development; Chapter 4 describes the 
research design; Chapter 5 reports the study’s sample population and empirical results; 
and Chapter 6 discusses the roles of boards of directors and compensation committees in 
designing CEO compensation packages. The final section concludes the paper with a 
discussion about the significance of the findings.   
 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Horizon Problem 
A manager’s tenure is much shorter than a firm’s lifespan. When managers have 
shorter horizons than a firm’s optimal investment horizon, managers prefer to engage 
projects with lower net present value but with higher current earnings, which would 
maximize the manager’s bonus compensation. This is what is known as a horizon 
problem, according to Smith and Watts (1982). In other words, managers with shorter 
horizons are myopic; they tend to focus on increasing the firm’s short-term earnings. At 
the beginning of their career, managers are concerned with reputation. Fama (1980) 
argues that managers are disciplined by the labor market because their human capital 
depends on the success of the firm. Therefore, CEOs care more about the firm’s long-
term success. However, as managers approach retirement, they have weaker career 
concerns and therefore the horizon problem is more severe (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). 
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Horizon problem predicts that retiring CEOs may reduce R&D expenditures or 
involve in accruals management to maximize their earnings-based compensation, 
irrespective of the impact on the long-term benefits of the shareholders. However, extant 
literature finds mixed evidence of R&D reduction and accruals management. Effective 
since 1974, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) require companies to 
expense R&D expenditures in the year that they are incurred. However, the benefits from 
R&D investment take years to be fully realized. Therefore, reducing R&D expenditures 
results in the increase of current-year accounting earnings. Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
finds empirical evidence of R&D reduction prior to CEO departures for a sample of firms 
with large R&D expenditures and CEO compensation based on earnings performance for 
firm-years from 1974 to 1988. They suggest that CEOs reduce R&D expenditures to 
increase their earnings-based compensation in the years prior to CEO departures, which 
is consistent with the CEO horizon problem. They find no evidence that the R&D 
reductions around CEO departures are driven by poor firm performance or because the 
outgoing CEOs leave new investment initiatives to the incoming CEOs. Specifically, they 
find that CEOs who leave the company after they reach mandatory retirement age and 
thus anticipate departure, reduce R&D expenditures even more. They also find similar 
reductions in advertising expenditures but not in capital expenditures, which do not affect 
earnings immediately as R&D expenditures.  
However, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) suggest that the reductions in R&D 
expenditures preceding CEO departures are driven by poor firm performance rather than 
horizon problems. Dechow and Sloan (1991) use a small, selected sample of firms in 
R&D intensive industries. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examine a larger sample of 
6 
CEO turnovers from the Forbes annual surveys during 1971 to 1989; they find that the 
growth rate of R&D in the CEO’s transition year (in which the old CEOs depart and the 
new CEOs assume office), and the CEO’s last full year (the year before the transition 
year) is not significantly different from the three years before the CEO’s last full year. 
They find no evidence of R&D reductions in the transition year and the last full year after 
controlling for firm performance, and no evidence of R&D reduction preceding CEO 
turnover for the subsample of CEO turnovers unrelated to poor firm performance.  
Also contrary to CEO horizon problem predictions, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
find that firms spend most on R&D and advertising in the CEO’s last year prior to 
retirement. They find that the level of R&D expenditures increases, but the R&D growth 
rate decreases as CEOs approach retirement. They further argue that the declining R&D 
growth rate prior to retirement is not driven by the CEO horizon problem, because they 
do not find an increase in concurrent earnings. Butler and Newman (1989) fail to find 
evidence of R&D reductions in the sample of firms with CEOs in their final year before 
departures compared with a matched sample of firms; they also fail to provide empirical 
evidence for the CEO horizon problem. They suggest that their findings do not identify 
when the CEO horizon problem is most severe. 
Consistent with the CEO horizon problem, several studies find a negative 
association between CEO age or tenure and R&D expenditures and suggest that CEOs 
reduce R&D as they grow older (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Lundstrum, 2002; Naveen, 
2006; Demers and Wang, 2009). However, Cazier (2011) points out the problems with 
these studies’ research design. He identifies two factors that induce a negative bias 
between CEO age and R&D expenditures in the cross-section, and thus erroneously 
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support the CEO horizon problem. He finds that: 1) firms that invest more in R&D are 
more likely to be delisted, so firms with CEOs who are older or have longer tenure invest 
less in R&D; and 2) firms that invest more in R&D are more likely to hire younger CEOs. 
He examines CEO retirement rather than CEO age and finds that CEOs do not reduce 
R&D in the five years prior to their retirement.  
Two recent studies, which argue that CEOs may use discretionary accruals to 
increase contemporaneous earnings, provide support for the CEO horizon problem 
(Kalyta, 2009; Antia et al., 2010). In a sample of Fortune 1000 firms from 1997 to 2006, 
Kalyta (2009) finds evidence of income-increasing accruals management in the years 
prior to CEO retirement only when the CEO’s Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan 
(SERP) is contingent on firm performance. His findings suggest that if CEOs have 
performance-contingent SERPs, they have a more powerful incentive to boost firm 
earnings in the final years prior to retirement, in which SERPs pensionable earnings are 
determined. He finds negative market reaction only after the retirement of the CEO with 
a performance-contingent SERP. Antia et al. (2010) use CEO expected tenures to proxy 
CEO decision horizons and argue that shorter CEO horizons are associated with greater 
agency costs, higher information risk, and less market valuation. They find that accruals 
management is negatively associated with CEO decision horizons, which is consistent 
with horizon problems, and which leads to more accruals management.  
However, several studies find inconsistencies with outgoing CEOs who boost 
earnings by involving income-increasing accruals management. Pourciau (1993) 
classifies CEO turnovers as routine turnovers in which a successor is chosen, or several 
contestants are identified; and non-routine turnovers, which include voluntary and 
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involuntary resignations. He focused on the non-routine CEO turnovers and found 
income-decreasing accruals and write-offs before the non-routine CEO turnovers. One 
reason for these results is that his model fails to control for firm performance. Murphy 
and Zimmerman (1993) did control for firm performance, and found a significant 
negative association between accruals and the transition year dummy. But after further 
controlling for the endogeneity of CEO turnover, no significant association is found. In a 
sample of Australian firms, Wells (2002) does not find income-increasing accruals 
management prior to CEO turnover, despite whether the turnovers are routine or non-
routine. In addition, he finds no evidence of income-increasing earnings management 
through non-current asset sales or abnormal and ordinary items before the CEO routine 
and non-routine turnovers.  
 
 
1.2 The Role of the Compensation Committee 
The CEO horizon problem is one example of the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Shareholders cannot directly monitor managers, so they trust 
the board of directors with monitoring responsibilities (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). As a subcommittee of the board of directors, the compensation 
committee is given the task of designing a compensation package that aligns the interests 
between shareholders and managers and therefore alleviates CEO horizon problem.  
A firm’s compensation committee is responsible for determining and overseeing 
the executive compensation process. For example, Apple Inc. describes the functions of 
its compensation committee in a proxy statement for its 2014 annual meeting of 
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shareholders as “reviewing the compensation arrangements for the Company’s executive 
officers, including the CEO, administering the Company’s equity compensation plans, 
and reviewing the Board’s compensation. The compensation committee’s authority to 
grant equity awards may not be delegated to the Company’s management or others” 
(Apple Inc. Proxy Statement of 2012). Hermanson et al. (2012) interview 17 
compensation committee chairs and three compensation committee members of public 
firms about the compensation committee process. According to the interviewees, one 
responsibility of the compensation committee is to oversee CEO compensation. Several 
studies also empirically support the important role that the compensation committee plays 
in designing CEO compensation (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1988).  
Accounting income is one of the performance measures used to determine CEO 
compensation (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Prior research provides evidence that when 
compensation committees determine CEO compensation based on accounting income, 
they treat income items differently. In fact, they sometimes shield certain income items, 
for example, restructuring charges (Dechow et al., 1994; Adut et al., 2003), and even 
reward CEOs for certain expenditures that reduce income (Cheng 2004). More 
importantly, the different treatments are based on individual circumstances. Balsam 
(1998) examines the association between different components of earnings and CEO cash 
compensation, and finds that when including CEO cash compensation, the weight on 
discretionary accruals is relatively lower than the weight on nondiscretionary accruals, 
which in turn is lower than the weight on operating cash flows. He also shows that the 
weight of positive discretionary accruals is higher than negative discretionary accruals, 
indicating that compensation committees reward CEOs for positive discretionary accruals 
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while avoiding punishing CEOs for negative discretionary accruals. He further 
documents that compensation committees reward CEOs for positive discretionary 
accruals even more if the firms need to meet an earnings target. Gaver and Gaver (1998) 
examine the weight of above-the-line earnings and below-the-line earnings when 
including CEO cash compensation. Their findings suggest that above-the-line and below-
the-line gains are included while above-the-line and below-the-line losses are excluded 
from CEO cash compensation. They separately examine unusual transactions, 
extraordinary transactions, and discontinued operations, for which gains are included 
while losses are excluded from CEO cash compensation. 
In a sample of firms reporting restructuring charges between 1982 and 1989, 
Dechow et al. (1994) specifically examine whether compensation committees shield CEO 
cash compensation from restructuring charges, which are reported as a component of 
income from continuing operations. They argue that restructuring charges can enhance 
firm value, but those costs reduce current earnings. Their findings suggest that CEO 
compensation is shielded from restructuring charges, especially when the restructuring 
charges are not frequent and the CEO has a shorter expected horizon. This is consistent 
with the compensation committees’ adjustment for the income-decreasing effects of 
restructuring charges. Following Dechow et al. (1994), Adut et al. (2003) find that 
compensation committees partially shield CEO compensation from restructuring charges 
after controlling for growth in CEO compensation for their sample between 1982 and 
1997, and the degree of shielding varies depending on the CEO tenure and how close the 
current restructuring charge is to the prior restructuring charge. Generally, Adut et al. 
(2003) find less shielding if the restructuring charges are more likely to be opportunistic 
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in nature. Duru et al. (2002) attempt to explain the reason of this shielding by analyzing 
the agency model. Their analysis suggests that if evaluated based on income with no 
adjustments, managers have no incentives to invest in value-enhancing but income-
decreasing activities. In addition, they provide empirical evidence that compensation 
committees shield recurring expenditures, such as R&D and advertising expenditures, 
and R&D expenditures are more filtered than advertising expenditures from CEO cash 
compensation.  
Compensation committees treat CEOs differently, providing various incentives 
for CEOs. Balsam (1998) reveals that when a CEO’s compensation is tied closely to 
earnings, then the CEO is more likely to use discretionary accruals to boost earnings. 
Cheng (2004) finds that the association between changes in R&D spending and changes 
in value of CEO annual option grants is significantly positive when the CEO approaches 
retirement and when the firm faces a small decline in earnings and a small loss, but 
insignificant when there is no horizon problem or myopia problem. Cheng’s (2004) 
findings indicate that compensation committees mitigate opportunistic R&D reduction by 
rewarding (penalizing) CEOs for increasing (reducing) R&D expenditures when a firm is 
faced with a CEO horizon problem and myopia problem. Huson et al. (2012) find that 
compensation committees are able to place a lower relative weight on the positive change 
in discretionary accruals compared with other components of earnings when setting CEO 
cash pay during the years before CEO voluntary turnovers. They claim that compensation 
committees allow income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase CEO 
compensation the same way as other earnings components during non-terminal years, 
since the reverse feature of accruals will reduce CEO compensation in the subsequent 
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years. However, when fewer possibilities reverse accruals, compensation committees 
intervene to reduce the relative weight on the increase of discretionary accruals when 
they decide a CEO’s cash compensation in his or her terminal years. They also show that 
Selling, General, and Administration (SG&A) expenditures are at least partially shielded 
from CEO compensation in the non-terminal years, but not shielded at all in the terminal 
years. Their results are consistent with the idea that compensation committees generally 
encourage spending in SG&A but less so during a CEO’s terminal years. 
Collectively, the prior literature shows that compensation committees use 
discretion to adjust CEO compensation to mitigate adverse incentives for CEOs. 
1.3 Compensation Committee Effectiveness 
Firms that separate ownership and control create a divergence in the interests 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Demsetz (1983) 
argues that compensation contracts can adequately align the interests of managers with 
those of shareholders. Prior studies provide support that compensation committees are 
able to alleviate the CEO horizon problem (Cheng 2004; Huson et al., 2012). However, 
compensation committees are not equally effective monitors. Uzun et al. (2004) note that 
the presence of a compensation committee is positively associated with the likelihood of 
fraud. They claim that compensation committees are “systematically dysfunctional” and 
responsible for “lucrative stock options” (Uzun et al., 2004). 
The monitoring effectiveness of compensation committees is affected by their 
characteristics (e.g. Sun and Cahan, 2012; Sun and Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009; 
Bebchuk et al., 2010; Collins et al., 2009; Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Uzun et 
al., 2004). Sun and Cahan (2012) argue that six compensation committee characteristics 
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affect compensation committee quality: the proportion of co-opted directors, the 
proportion of senior directors, the proportion of directors who are CEOs of other 
companies, the proportion of directors with block shareholdings in the company, the 
proportion of directors who have three or more board seats, and the size of the 
compensation committee. They conduct a principal components analysis of these six 
characteristics and develop a compensation committee quality measure. They show that 
their compensation committee quality measure is negatively associated with CEO tenure, 
institutional holdings, growth opportunities, and firm size. Two other studies (Sun et al., 
2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009) use the same measure of compensation committee quality to 
examine whether the compensation committee quality affects the pay-for-performance. 
Sun et al. (2009) investigate a sample of 474 firms with compensation committees 
composed solely of independent directors in 2001, when compensation committee 
independence was not a mandatory requirement. They suggest that a compensation 
committee’s quality has a positive effect on the relationship between a CEO’s stock 
option grants and the firm’s future performance, measured as future operating 
performance and future stock returns. They also separately examine the effect of the six 
compensation committee characteristics on the pay-for-performance sensitivity. They 
find consistent evidence that the proportion of co-opted directors, senior directors, CEO 
directors, and busy directors affect the pay-for-performance, but find weak evidence for 
director shareholdings and size of the committee. Sun and Cahan (2009) show that the 
relationship between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings increase as a 
compensation committee’s quality increases. Moreover, the effect of a compensation 
committee is less positive in firms with high growth or incurring losses, which is 
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consistent with the idea that high growth firms and loss-bearing firms rely on other 
performance measures than accounting earnings. The findings of those two studies 
suggest that high-quality compensation committees can design better compensation 
packages that align a CEO’s incentives with the firm’s economic benefits.  
Bebchuk et al. (2010) examine the association between corporate governance and 
the timing of CEO stock options. They document that a compensation committee consists 
of independent directors and at least one blockholder who is less likely to grant CEO 
options opportunistically at the lowest price of the month. Similarly, Collins et al. (2009) 
document a negative association between the likelihood of backdating CEO stock option 
grants and having an outsider who owns at least five percent of outstanding shares on the 
compensation committee. 
Several studies also claim that compensation committee characteristics to relate to 
the disclosure transparency of executive compensation (Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 
2010). Managers are generally inclined to avoid the scrutiny from shareholders and 
therefore reluctant to disclose their compensation, while better corporate governance 
leads to more disclosures. Laksmana (2008) suggests that disclosure transparency of 
compensation practices is positively associated with compensation committee 
independence, meeting frequency, and size. Using Australian data, Nelson et al. (2010) 
find that firms with more independent and effective compensation committees are more 
likely to disclose sensitive information related to executive stock options. They also use a 
principal components analysis to reduce three compensation committee characteristics, 
including committee size, number of committee meetings, and proportion of independent 
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directors on the committee, into one factor to proxy for compensation committee 
independence and effectiveness. 
A growing body of literature has examined whether the independent status of 
compensation committee directors affects how effective the compensation committee 
protects shareholders from excessive CEO pay (Daily et al., 1998; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Sapp, 2008; Conyon, 2006; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Vafeas, 2003b; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998; Newman and Mozes, 1999). Despite the general belief that 
better governance can oversee CEOs’ rent extraction more effectively, the literature finds 
little evidence that a more independent compensation committee leads to lower CEO 
compensation. Daily et al. (1998) investigate whether a compensation committee with a 
higher proportion of “captured directors” tends to increase CEO pay and CEO non-
contingent pay. To define a director as being “captured,” Daily et al. (1998) uses three 
measures: whether the director is affiliated with the CEO of the firm, whether the director 
is appointed during the tenure of an incumbent CEO, and whether the director is a CEO 
of another company. They find no significant association between CEO pay and the 
proportion of affiliated directors, or the proportion of CEO directors on the compensation 
committee. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) examine the change in CEO 
compensation when firms make changes to the composition of their boards of directors in 
compliance with a list of board requirements set by the SEC in 2002. They find no 
evidence that the requirements imposed on independent compensation committees are 
associated with a reduction in CEO compensation, although they document a negative 
association between the requirement which states that the majority of the board of 
directors must be independent and the change of CEO compensation. This infers that the 
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board’s independence is more important than the compensation committee’s 
independence when determining CEO compensation. 
Conyon (2006) shows that CEO pay is not affected by the presence of affiliated 
directors on compensation committees. He uses the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) database and defines directors as “affiliated” if they are either “Employee” 
or “Linked.” According to IRRC, a linked director is “is linked to the company through 
certain relationships, and whose views may be affected because of such links” (IRRC), 
for example a former employee. Similarly, Newman and Mozes (1999) classify inside 
directors as former employees of the focal firm, employees of a firm who have the focal 
firm’s CEO on their board of directors, current employees of a firm conducting material 
business with the focal firm, or interlocking directors. Using data from 1992, they 
conclude that CEO pay is not higher in firms with compensation committees that include 
insiders, than those whose compensation committees are composed solely of outsiders. 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) classify directors who are not current or formal employees, 
are not immediate family members, or who have no business ties with the firm as outside 
directors. They find little evidence that CEO pay is higher when the percentage of outside 
directors on a compensation committee is lower, or when the CEOs are members of their 
compensation committee. Vafeas (2003b) defines insiders as directors who are or were 
firm executives or employees of subsidiaries. He finds no evidence among a sample of 
271 firms from 1991 to 1997 that CEO pay is related to the presence or percentage of 
insiders on the compensation committee.  
Two studies find a positive association between compensation committee 
independence and CEO compensation. In a sample of Canadian firms, Sapp (2008) finds 
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that the number of independent directors on a compensation committee is positively 
associated with CEO pay, which is contrary to his prediction. The author argues that this 
finding may be due to the definition of “independence.” He also finds that a higher 
proportion of directors who are CEOs of other companies and a lower proportion of 
financial experts leads to higher CEO compensation. In their sample of U.K. companies, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) also document an unanticipated positive association between 
the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the remuneration committee and management 
pay. 
Some of the above-mentioned studies (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Newman and 
Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003b) and a number of other studies (Capezio et al., 2011; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998) have addressed whether compensation committee independence 
affects CEO pay-for-performance. Capezio et al. (2011) examine a sample of Australian 
companies and find no evidence that a compensation committee dominated by non-
executive directors improves CEO pay-for-performance. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) 
find only marginal evidence that the proportion of outside directors on a compensation 
committee is positively related to CEO equity-based pay; they also find no evidence that 
the pay mix or pay-for-performance in firms with a compensation committee composed 
only of outsiders is different than those with a less independent compensation committee. 
Overall, they do not provide strong support that the proportion of outsiders in a 
compensation committee increases CEO incentives. Newman and Mozes (1999) find no 
significant difference between the pay-for-performance in firms with compensation 
committees that have no insiders, and firms with compensation committees with insiders 
when the firm’s return is positive. However, they find a significant difference when the 
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firm’s return is negative, although the pay is not related to performance, despite whether 
compensation committees consist of insiders or not. Their findings suggest that 
compensation committees with insiders reward CEOs for a favorable performance the 
same way a compensation committees with no insiders would, but those with insiders are 
more likely to shield CEO compensation from unfavorable performance. In addition, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) show that the pay-for-performance is greater in firms with 
remuneration committees with a higher proportion of nonexecutive directors. Vafeas 
(2003b) provides evidence that before the compensation disclosure rules of the SEC in 
1992, insider participation in compensation committees led to more non-contingent pay, 
but less contingent pay and thus less risk for CEOs.  
Extant research about compensation committees’ independence reflects, to some 
degree, the public’s concern that insider participation in compensation committees may 
compromise its independence and may lead to an excessive compensation package that 
CEO’s do not deserve. Also motivated by the public’s concern, regulations have become 
stricter regarding compensation committees’ degree of independence over the years. In 
1992, the SEC adopted provisions to encourage directors without ties to the firm to be 
more responsible for establishing executive pay by increasing disclosure requirements 
when corporate insiders serve on compensation committees. The 1993 congressional tax 
code stipulates that compensation committees must be composed solely of two or more 
outside directors, or any performance-based executive pay in excess of $1 million is not 
tax deductible. Approved in 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ 
require listed firms’ compensation committees to consist solely of independent directors. 
According to NYSE section 303A, an independent director is defined as a director with 
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no material relationship with the listed company, directly, or as a partner, shareholder, or 
officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company. In addition, NYSE 
section 303A specifically states that a director is not independent if within three years, 
the director has been an employee, an executive officer, or an immediate family member 
of the executive officer within the last three years; if the director or his/her family has 
received more than $120,000 direct compensation, except for directorship or prior service 
in the firm; if the director or his/her family has been an executive officer of another 
company in which any current executive officers serve or served on the focal company’s 
compensation committee; and, if the director is a current employee or family member of 
the current executive officer of a company that does business with the focal company at 
an amount exceeding $1 million, or 2% of the company’s consolidated gross revenues. 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires each member of a compensation committee in a 
public company to be independent if: the compensation committee member’s source of 
compensation is received from the company, or the compensation committee member is 
affiliated with the company or its subsidiary.  
However, the literature has not determined conclusively whether a compensation 
committee’s independence affects CEO pay or pay-for-performance. One explanation for 
the mixed findings may be because it is hard to measure the real independence of a 
compensation committee. According to Hermanson et al. (2012), many compensation 
committee directors interviewed had previous professional or personal connections to 
CEOs at the time they were appointed; however, they are independent if judged by the 
stock exchange listing standards. Likewise, Bebchuk et al. (2005) allege that even 
directors who satisfy the legal requirement for independence may not truly be 
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independent, because the CEO controls the director nomination process and maintains 
social relations with directors. O’Reilly and Main (2007) point out two important social 
psychological effects: reciprocity and social influence. Under reciprocity, directors may 
feel obligated to the CEO if they believe they get their board seats, to some degree, 
thanks to the CEO. Under social influence, directors sympathize with the CEO, especially 
if they share more similarities with the CEO. They provide empirical evidence that the 
board of directors is more prone to reciprocity and social influence tends to be more 
generous on CEO pay decisions. 
1.4 Co-opted Directors 
Coles et al. (2014) argue that directors appointed during the tenure of an 
incumbent CEO (i.e., co-opted directors) are less independent. Consistent with their 
predictions, they find that the proportion of co-opted directors on the board of directors is 
negatively associated with turnover-to-performance sensitivity, and positively associated 
with CEO pay and investment, after controlling for the proportion of outsiders on the 
board. Their findings infer that co-opted directors are more sympathetic to CEOs, as 
evidenced by their tendency to keep CEOs who have performed poorly, to be generous 
about CEO pay, and to agree to CEOs’ over-investment. They also argue that non-co-
opted independence can better explain the independent status of the board, which is the 
proportion of directors who are outsiders and appointed before the CEO assumes office. 
They document that non-co-opted-independence increases CEO turnover-to-performance 
and pay-for-performance, while decreasing CEO pay and investment.  
Similarly, Lambert et al. (1993) find that the percentage of outside board 
members appointed by the CEO increases the level of executive compensation; they 
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investigate the confidential compensation data at different organization levels, including 
plant manager, divisional CEO, group CEO, and corporate CEO. Core et al. (1999) also 
find a positive association between CEO compensation and the percentage of outside 
directors who are appointed after the CEO takes office, indicating that CEOs’ 
involvement in the nomination of new directors increases their own pay.   
Wade et al. (1990) and Collins et al. (2009) reveal a lack of dependence among 
co-opted directors. They find that as the percentage of directors appointed during an 
incumbent CEO’s tenure on the board increases, the CEO is more likely to be granted a 
golden parachute, indicating that CEOs have more influence over the board concerning 
their compensation package if the board is composed of more co-opted directors. Collins 
et al. (2009) find that a higher proportion of co-opted directors on the board increases the 
probability of backdating CEO stock option grants.  
Prior studies focus on the boards’ co-options, while only one study (Daily et al., 
1998) examines the compensation committee co-option and provides rather weak 
evidence that the compensation committee co-option increases CEO compensation. Daily 
et al. (1998) find a positive association between the proportion of co-opted directors on 
the compensation committee and CEO total pay and non-contingent pay in one of three 
years for their sample from 1992 to 1994.  
Two underlying reasons may have contributed to the findings of the above studies. 
First, CEOs exert considerable influence on the director nomination process. It has been 
criticized that directors are selected by the very CEOs whom they are supposed to 
monitor. CEOs propose the slate of directors, and the slate is almost always voted in by 
the shareholders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Cai et al. (2009) also show that the 
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differences in shareholders’ votes for directors are small. DeAngelo et al. (1989) 
document that even when shareholders disagree with CEOs in a proxy fight, the odds for 
shareholders to win the board seat are only about one-third. Mace (1971) interviewed 
CEOs and directors, and found that CEOs exert considerable influence on the director 
nomination process. With power over the nomination of new directors, CEOs can 
negotiate more favorable compensation contracts. For example, Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004) document that CEOs receive a higher mergers and acquisitions (M&As) bonus 
when they sit on the nomination committee, and when they are also the board chair. 
After the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, a CEO’s direct involvement in the director 
nomination process has significantly reduced. For example, NYSE Corporate 
Governance, section 303A, which was approved on June 30, 2003, requires listed 
companies to have a nominating committee composed entirely of independent directors. 
A CEO can still exert informal or indirect influence over the nomination, however. 
NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules, section 
805, have similar requirements. However, CEOs can still exert indirect influence on the 
appointment of directors.   
Studies focusing on CEOs’ influence in the director nomination process suggest 
that CEOs favor directors who are sympathetic (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989), who 
are similar to themselves (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Hwang and Kim, 2009) or who are 
gray directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) to gain more board support. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1989) allege that the longer a CEO stays in a company, then he or she 
may appoint more sympathetic directors to the board of directors. Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) allege that CEOs prefer directors who share a similar functional background, age, 
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education level, and outsider/insider status, since those directors are less likely to 
disagree with CEOs. They consider the director nomination process to be a power battle 
between CEOs and the existing board, in which more CEO power leads to the 
appointment of directors who are more similar demographically to the CEO. Meanwhile, 
directors who are more similar to the board will be appointed if the board is more 
powerful relative to the CEO. Their findings generally support their predictions. They 
also find that the change in the similarity between the CEO and the board is positively 
associated with the change in a CEO’s total compensation; it is negatively associated 
with the change in a CEO’s contingent compensation, indicating that by appointing a 
more similar director, CEOs may increase their total pay while decreasing their exposure 
to risk. Similarly, Hwang and Kim (2009) find evidence that the number of socially 
linked directors increases as a new CEO’s tenure at the firm progresses, suggesting that 
CEOs select directors who share similar ideas and views, or who have certain social ties 
to the CEO. O'Reilly et al. (1988) observe a significant association between the salary 
levels of compensation committee directors and CEO compensation. They suggest that 
CEOs may select directors who are highly paid current or retired CEOs of other 
companies so that those directors use their own compensation as a reference when they 
determine CEO compensation. But they fail to establish the causality because they do not 
have the data for the director’s appointment date. 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) reveal that when a CEO serves on the nomination 
committee or there is no separate nomination committee, companies appoint a higher 
number of gray directors and fewer independent directors. Their results indicate that 
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when CEOs are involved in the director nomination, they select directors more subjective 
to their control.   
The second reason why co-opted directors are less independent is because they 
may feel as if they owe their board seats to the CEO (Dailey et al., 1998); they are likely 
to offer their gratitude by biasing for the CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk et al., 
2005). In other words, co-opted compensation committee directors may put CEO interest 
over their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.  
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior studies investigating firms’ CEO horizon problem focus on two 
opportunistic behaviors that CEOs exhibit to maximize their earnings-based 
compensation. The first is opportunistic R&D reduction, and the second is opportunistic 
accruals management. Although career concerns mitigate a firm’s CEO horizon problem 
early in the CEO’s career, career concerns may be subjected to the CEO horizon problem 
when CEOs approach retirement. To alleviate this horizon problem, compensation 
committees can take an active role to adjust CEO compensation to induce the right 
incentives. 
Literature examining the association between CEO compensation and the 
components of earnings suggest that compensation committees intervene to adjust CEO 
compensation. For example, according to Cheng (2004), a positive association between 
change in R&D expenditures and change in CEO compensation suggests that 
compensation committees reward investment in R&D and punish opportunistic reduction 
in R&D expenditures. He finds no association between CEO compensation and R&D 
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expenditures, which is consistent with prior literature that R&D expenditures are 
generally shielded from CEO compensation. However, he finds a positive association 
between change in R&D expenditures and change in CEO stock option compensation 
when CEOs approach retirement, which suggests that compensation committees penalize 
CEOs for opportunistic R&D reduction in a CEO’s final years before retirement. Using a 
sample of 476 firms in which CEOs retired or departed voluntarily, Huson et al. (2012) 
investigated the effect of the horizon problem on the association between positive change 
in discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. They document that the relative 
weight of positive change in discretionary accruals reduces significantly in the year of 
CEO turnover, and in the year before. They suggest that although an increase in 
discretionary accruals is treated the same way as other earnings components in CEOs’ 
non-terminal years, the increase receives less weight compared to other earnings 
components when CEOs are in their terminal years. This indicates that compensation 
committees restrain CEOs from opportunistic income-increasing accruals management 
prior to CEO departures. To some degree, these studies are in line with the optimal 
contracting theory that compensation contracts are optimally designed to motivate the 
managers to act in the best interests of shareholders (Holmstrom, 1979).  However, this 
literature reveals the roles of compensation committees in mitigating horizon problems 
without investigating compensation committees directly.  
The effectiveness of compensation committees can be different between firms. 
Cheng (2004) separately investigates firms with opportunistic R&D reductions when 
CEOs approach retirement, and firms without such reductions. He only finds a significant 
association between changes in CEO stock option grants and changes in R&D 
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expenditures in firms without opportunistic R&D reductions, but not in other firms. This 
brings up the question: why do some firms successfully adjust CEO compensation and 
thus mitigate horizon problems, while others don’t? For one thing, firms’ different 
reactions to CEO horizon problem may be due to the different degree of co-option among 
compensation committees.  
Under the managerial power theory, because managers use their influence to 
extract rents from the board of directors, compensation contracts always deviate from the 
optimum (Finkelstein, 1992). In other words, to control the compensation contracting 
process, CEOs need agreeable or loyal directors on the board of directors. Therefore, they 
tend to appoint directors who are sympathetic. These co-opted directors feel obligated to 
their CEOs and as a result make decisions favorable to the CEOs. In a recent study, Coles 
et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that board co-option decreases monitoring 
effectiveness. They document that CEO pay and investment are positively related to 
board co-option, while CEO turnover to performance sensitivity is negatively related to 
board co-option. They further suggest that the proportion of co-opted directors who are 
outsiders increases CEO pay, while the proportion of co-opted directors who are insiders 
is not related to CEO pay or CEO pay-for-performance, inferring that even outside 
directors’ independence, if co-opted by CEOs, are damaged. Furthermore, they propose 
that the proportion of outsiders who are not co-opted by CEOs is a more ‘incisive’ 
measure for board monitoring because it increases CEO turnover to performance 
sensitivity, and to pay-for-performance sensitivity, while reducing CEO pay and 
investment. Their findings are consistent with the managerial power theory, which states 
that CEOs use their power to gain control over the board. Social and psychological 
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factors keep directors from real independence. Directors who are co-opted by the 
incumbent CEO may feel obligated to the CEO, and as a result, are less willing to 
challenge the CEO. 
Coles et al. (2014) examine entire boards of directors. It is not clear that the 
increased CEO pay and reduced CEO pay-for-performance is driven by the co-option of 
compensation committees or the co-option of the board. Similarly, Lambert et al. (1993), 
Wade et al. (1990), and Collins et al. (2009) also focus on the co-option of the board. 
Daily et al. (1998) examine the co-option of compensation committees. However, they 
document little empirical evidence that the co-option of compensation committees is 
positively associated with CEO non-contingent pay in 1992, but no evidence for 1993 or 
1994. They find no association between the co-option of compensation committees and 
CEO contingent pay or CEO total pay.  
Excessive CEO payment has been under fire. Since the authority to set CEO 
compensation is delegated to compensation committees, if co-option decreases the 
monitoring effectiveness of the compensation committee, then the co-option may 
increase CEO compensation. Therefore, I predict:  
H1: CEO compensation is positively associated with the co-option of 
compensation committees.  
Prior literature examining the CEO horizon problem found mixed evidence of 
opportunistic R&D reductions and opportunistic accruals management. One explanation 
for the lack of consistent evidence in support of the CEO horizon problem may be due to 
the intervention of compensation committees. Effective compensation committees should 
predict CEO horizon problem and mitigate CEOs’ opportunistic behavior. However, if 
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compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective monitors, 
they are less likely to alleviate CEO opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, I predict: 
H2a: R&D expenditures are negatively associated with the CEO horizon 
problem when compensation committees are dominated by co-opted 
directors. 
H2b: Discretionary accruals are positively associated with the CEO 
horizon problem when compensation committees are dominated by co-
opted directors. 
CEOs’ compensation packages are an important means of resolving the conflict 
between shareholders and the CEO (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978?). For example, 
compensation packages can be used to prevent a CEO’s opportunistic behaviors. If R&D 
expenditures are shielded from CEO compensation, CEOs’ incentives to cut R&D 
expenditures will be alleviated. Cheng (2004) finds a positive association between change 
in R&D and change in CEO stock options when a firm is confronted with a CEO horizon 
problem, indicating that compensation committees reward R&D investment and punish 
R&D reduction when CEOs have incentives to act opportunistically. According to 
interviews conducted by Hermanson et al. (2012), compensation committees 
communicate with CEOs about their compensation packages. CEOs who are aware that 
R&D expenditures are shielded or rewarded should refrain from opportunistic R&D 
cutting. Compensation committees who are aligned with shareholders’ best interests are 
more likely to predict CEO horizon problem and adjust CEO compensation accordingly. 
Therefore, effective compensation committees should shield or reward an increase in 
R&D in a CEO’s final years before his or her retirement, to mitigate the CEO horizon 
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problem. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be 
less responsive to the CEO horizon problem or less willing to punish CEOs for R&D 
reduction. As a result, R&D expenditures are less shielded from CEO compensation, or 
R&D reduction is punished less severely, so that as CEOs reduce R&D expenditures, 
their compensation increases. Therefore, I predict:    
H3a: Changes in CEO compensation are more negatively associated with 
changes in R&D expenditures when firms have a CEO horizon 
problem and compensation committees are dominated by the co-opted 
directors.   
The CEO horizon problem is also alleviated if income-increasing discretionary 
accruals are weighted less when deciding CEO compensation. Effective compensation 
may reduce the association between CEO compensation and income-increasing 
discretionary accruals when firms are faced with the CEO horizon problem. However, 
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may be less effective in 
adjusting the association between CEO compensation and income-increasing 
discretionary accruals in the final years before CEO retirement, and as a result, when 
CEOs are involved in income-increasing accruals management, their compensation 
increases. Therefore, I predict: 
 H3b: Changes in CEO compensation are more positively associated 
with income-increasing discretionary accruals when firms are 
confronted with the CEO horizon problem and compensation 
committees are dominated by the co-opted directors.   
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Variable Construction 
Compensation Committee Co-option 
Following Coles et al. (2014), I measure co-option CC_COOPTION as the 
percentage of co-opted directors on the compensation committee. The effect of co-opted 
directors on CEO compensation decisions may not be linear. Therefore, I define co-opted 
directors as directors appointed after the incumbent CEO takes office. I define 
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors COOPTED_CC as a dummy 
variable that equals one if the majority of directors on the compensation committee are 
co-opted directors, and zero otherwise.  
Horizon Problem 
I follow Kalyta (2009) and define Horizon as a dummy variable that equals one if 
CEOs are in any of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. The 
first reason I focus on CEO retirement rather than on CEO turnovers is because retiring 
CEOs have more severe horizon problems since they are less concerned with their 
reputation on the labor market (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Also, minus unplanned 
CEO turnover, CEOs can plan their retirement. Most companies have a specified 
retirement age (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007)2. CEOs who are able to predict their 
departures have more chances to cut R&D or manage accruals (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
I first identify CEO turnovers, and then remove the CEOs who leave their firm at an age 
                                                            
2 Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggest that companies expect CEOs to retire at the specified 
age. If CEOs leave early, they will not obtain the full value of the pension benefit. If CEOs stay 
beyond the specified retirement age, they forfeit the right to pension benefits that would 
otherwise have been collected by retiring.  
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younger than 63, consistent with Kalyta (2009). RiskMetrics identifies the reason for 
CEO departures, although this information is missing for most firms. Out of 303 
retirements identified by RiskMetrics, the retirement age ranges from 46 to 82. The 
average retirement age is 64.6, and the median is 64.5. 77 CEOs retired at 64, 61 CEOs 
retired at 65, 55 CEOs retired at 60, and 52 CEOs retired at 63. I also assume the 
retirement age as 60, 61, and 62, and the results are similar. I also impose another 
criterion that a retired CEO must have held the position for more than three full years to 
eliminate the potential effect of the horizon problem associated with the departure of the 
previous CEO, similar to prior studies (Kalyta, 2009; Huson et al., 2012). The pre-
departure years are two years before CEO retirement in this study. 
 
CEO compensation 
Total CEO compensation is defined as the sum of a CEO’s salary, bonus, other 
annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other 
compensation, and value of option grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). CEO cash 
compensation includes salary and a bonus. CEO long-term compensation is measured as 
the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. 
I use the natural logarithm of all the compensation measures to reduce heteroskedasticity, 
similar to prior studies (Cheng, 2004; Huson et al., 2012).  I also adjust all the 
compensation measures to 2003 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. My findings are 
robust without the adjustment.   
I examine cash compensation, total compensation, and long-term compensation 
separately, because compensation committees may use different compensation 
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components to mitigate opportunistic R&D curtailment and accruals management. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) show that equity-based compensation can be used to alleviate 
R&D reduction. Cheng (2004) documents that compensation committees adjust CEO 
stock options that are vested in future years when R&D investments benefit the firm. 
They suggest stock options are used rather than cash compensation to guarantee the 
quality of R&D investments. However, Huson et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
compensation committees adjust CEO cash compensation to prevent accruals 
management. They do not test long-term based compensation; nevertheless, they claim 
that most of CEO supplemental employee retirement plans (SERPs) are based on CEO 
cash compensation during CEOs’ final years before retirement, and Kalyta (2009) only 
finds accruals management in firms with a retiring CEO whose SERP depends on firm 
performance.  
Discretionary accruals 
I measure discretionary accruals using the forward-looking discretionary accruals 
model developed by Dechow et al. (2003). Specifically, I define total accruals TAi,t as the 
difference between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations, 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t. I then estimate the following model 
cross-sectionally by industry3 and year.  
TAi,t = α + β1((1 + k) ΔSALEi,t- ΔRECi,t) + β2PPEi,t + β3 Ai,t-1 + 
β4GR_SALEi,t + εi,t                 (1a) 
                                                            
3Industry is defined by two-digit SIC code. 
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Where k4 is the slope coefficient from the regression of change in accounts receivable on 
change in sales for each industry and year group, and captures the expected change in 
accounts receivable for a given change in sales. ΔSALEi,t is the change in sales from the 
year t-1 to the year t scaled by total assets at t-1, ΔRECi,t is the change in net receivables 
from the year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets at t-1, PPEi,t is the gross property plants 
and equipment in year t scaled by total assets at t-1, Ai,t-1 is total assets at the beginning of 
year t, and GR_SALEi,t-1 is the sales growth from year t to year t+1.  
Nondiscretionary accruals for each firm-year observation are calculated by 
applying industry and year-specific parameters β1, β2, and β3 as follows: 
NDAi,t = α + β1((1 + k) ΔSALEi,t- ΔRECi,t) + β2PPEi,t + β3 Ai,t-1 + 
β4GR_SALEi,t                         (1b) 
Discretionary accruals are then estimated by subtracting the predicted level of 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) from total accruals (TA), as follows: 
Discretionary accrualsi,t = TAi,t – NDAi,t         (1c) 
3.2 Empirical Model and Control Variables 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that CEO compensation is higher if the compensation 
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, a CEO is more likely to enjoy 
increased compensation in the final years before retirement if the compensation 
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. To test H1, I run the model (2), as 
specified below: 
 lnCEO_PAYi,t = α + β1COOPTED_CCi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3ROAi,t + 
β4CEO_TENUREi,t + β5CEO_OWNERSHIPi,t + 
                                                            
 
4 K is restricted to be between 0 and 1, following Dechow et al. (2003). 
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β6CEO_CHAIRi,t + β7B_INDEPENDENCEi,t + β8B_SIZEi,t + 
β9B_FEMALEi,t + G_INDEX + YEAR + εi,t               (2) 
Where COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable that equals one if the majority of 
compensation committee directors are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero 
otherwise. Hypothesis H1 predicts the coefficient β1 to be positive and significant. 
My control variables are similar to Coles et al. (2014). SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of sales, RET is the firm’s stock return, ROA is the earnings before 
extraordinary item divided by total assets, CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure, 
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of outstanding shares held by the CEO, 
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is the chairman of the 
board of directors, and zero otherwise, B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of 
outsiders on the board of directors, B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors 
on a board, divided by total outstanding shares, B_SIZE is the number of directors on 
board, B_FEMALE is an indicator that equals one if at least one of the directors on board 
is female, and zero otherwise, and G_INDEX is the governance index described by 
Gompers et al. (2003), which states that G1 equals one if G < = 6, and zero otherwise; G2 
equals one if 7 < = G < = 9, and zero otherwise; G3 equals one if 10 < = G < = 12, and 
zero otherwise; G4 equals one if G > = 13, and zero otherwise. I also control year fixed 
effect (YEAR). 
Consistent with prior literature, I expect that CEO compensation positively 
associates with firm size (SIZE), as CEOs of larger firms add more value (Smith and 
Watts, 1992), and better firm performance, as measured by RET and ROA (Murphy, 1985; 
Smith and Watts, 1992). Core et al. (1999) show that CEO compensation positively 
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relates to CEO_CHAIR, B_SIZE, and negatively relates to CEO_OWNERSHIP, as weak 
governance tends to increase CEO compensation. I do not predict the sign for 
B_OWNERSHIP and B_INDEPENDENCE because Core et al. (1999) find an 
insignificant association between CEO compensation and B_OWNERSHIP, and a 
negative association between CEO compensation and the proportion of insiders on the 
board of directors, which is contrary to their prediction. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
suggest that female directors impact board decisions as well. I expect that CEO 
compensation varies with the B_FEMALE, but I do not predict the sign for the 
association. Hill and Phan (1991) suggest that the CEO’s control over the board of 
directors and internal information system increase as CEO tenure increases. They find 
that as CEO tenure grows, CEO pay is more related to firm size and firm risk, but less 
related to firm performance, which indicates CEOs with longer tenure are more capable 
to influence their compensation packages. Drawing from their findings, I predict a 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO tenure. 
I rely on the model of Cazier (2011) to test Hypothesis H2a. Cazier (2011) finds 
no evidence that R&D spending is related to the CEO horizon problem, and concludes 
that CEOs do not cut R&D spending in their final years prior to retirement. However, he 
fails to take into account the role of the compensation committee in mitigating CEO 
opportunistic R&D cutting. H2a predicts that R&D spending may negatively associate 
with the CEO horizon problem if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted 
directors, who are less effective monitors. I test H2a by estimating model (3) as follows:   
RDi,t = α + β1HORIZONi,t + β2COOPTED_CCi,t + β3HORIZONi,t 
×COOPTED_CCi,t + β4TOBINS_Qi,t + β5LAG_RETi,t + β6FCFi,t + 
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β7ROAi,t + β8SIZEi,t + β9FIRM_AGEi,t + β10 EQUITY_INCENTIVESi,t 
+ β11INDUSTRY_RDi,t + YEAR + εi,t                         (3) 
Where RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets, COOPTED_CC is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the majority of compensation committee directors are co-opted 
by the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise, and HORIZON is an indicator variable that 
equals to one if the CEO is in the final two years before retirement, and zero otherwise. 
The interaction term between HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is interpreted as the indicator 
variable that equals one if the CEO is approaching retirement and the compensation 
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. According to H2a, the coefficient β3 
should be significantly negative, which indicates that R&D reduction is expected only 
when compensation committees fail to mitigate CEO opportunistic behaviors. 
I also control for other variables that may affect R&D expenditures and relate to 
the CEO horizon problem and compensation committee co-option, which are similar to 
Cazier (2011). TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value 
of debt, all scaled by total assets, LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from the previous 
year, FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all 
scaled by sales, ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets, SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t, FIRM_AGE is the 
number of years between year t and the first year the company was listed on Compustat. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a one percent change in 
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stock price, as measured in Core and Guay’s study (2002)5 . INDUSTRY_RD is the 
average R&D expenditure of other firms in the same two-digit SIC industry.  
I predict the coefficient on TOBINS_Q and LAG_RET to be positive, since firms 
with more growth opportunities may invest more in R&D. Consistent with Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994), I predict that R&D expenditures positively associate with internal 
finance, which is measured by the firm’s free cash flow (FCF). I predict that R&D 
expenditures negatively relate to the accounting flexibility, as measured by ROA, since 
Wang and D’Souza (2006) suggest that when accounting flexibility is low, managers are 
more likely to engage in real earnings management. I expect that R&D spending varies 
with firm size. Cohen and Klepper (1996) suggest that larger firms can apply R&D 
results to greater output and therefore reduce the average cost of R&D. Based on the 
findings of Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004), I predict that firm age (FIRM_AGE) 
negatively associates with R&D expenditures, since older firms are less likely to 
introduce innovations. CEOs with more equity holdings are more long-term oriented and 
willing to spend in R&D, although R&D expenditures reduce current earnings (Barker 
and Mueller, 2002). Therefore, I predict the coefficient on EQUITY_INCENTIVES to be 
positive. Consistent with prior studies (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cheng, 2004), I also 
control for the industry average R&D expenditures. I exclude each firm-year from the 
calculation of the industry average R&D to prevent a mechanical relation between RD 
and INDUSTRY_RD.   
                                                            
5 I calculate EQUITY_INCENTIVES as 1% × the firm’s share price × (# of shares + # of options × option 
delta). I follow Core and Guay (2002) methodology to calculate option delta separately for newly granted 
options, unexercisable options, and exercisable options before the year of 2006. After the passage of SFAS 
123R, Execucomp stops providing the inputs necessary to calculate Black-Scholes value of option delta. I 
follow Execucomp assumptions to construct self-calculated inputs. 
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To test hypothesis H2b, I run the following model (4) cross-sectionally: 
DAi,t = α + β1HORIZONi,t + β2COOPTED_CCi,t + β3HORIZONi,t 
×CO_OPTED_CCi,t + β4EQUITY_INCENTIVESi,t + β5SIZEi,t + 
β6STD_CASHFLOWi,t + β7STD_REVi,t + β8STD_SALESGROWTHi,t + 
β9OLDFIRMi,t + β10LEVERAGEi,t + β11MARKETTOBOOKi,t + 
G_INDEX  + EXCHANGE  + INDUSTRY + YEAR + εi,t              (4) 
Hypothesis H2b predicts the coefficient β3 on the interaction term between 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC to be significantly positive, if CEOs have incentive to 
engage in accruals management to boost their earnings-based compensation, and if 
compensation committees dominated by co-opted director fail to mitigate their incentives. 
DA is the discretionary accruals derived from the equation (1c).  
My control variables are similar to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). I control 
for CEO equity incentive, as CEOs have more incentive to manage earnings when their 
wealth is more sensitive to the firms’ share price (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). I 
follow Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) to measure CEO equity incentives. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in a CEO's wealth from a 1% change in 
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the 
dollar change, salary, and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
beginning of fiscal year t. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is 
the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four 
years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current 
and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm has been listed on Compustat for 
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more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total 
assets. MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets ranked within each year. G_INDEX represents the governance 
indicator variables described in Gompers et al. (2003). G1 is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the G-score is less than or equal to 6, and zero otherwise. G2 is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the G-score is between 7 (inclusive) and 9 (inclusive), and zero otherwise. 
G3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the G-score is between 10 (inclusive) and 12 
(inclusive), and zero otherwise. G4 is a dummy variable equal to one if the G-score is 
greater than or equal to 13, and zero otherwise. EXCHANGE is an indicator for the stock 
exchange where the company is traded. INDUSTRY is the Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification indicator. YEAR represents year indicators.  
I expect firm size (SIZE) to negatively associate with discretionary accruals, since 
larger firms are under more scrutiny by analysts and the press (Duellman et al., 2013). I 
expect that discretionary accruals vary with firm age (OLDFIRM), the standard deviation 
of cash flows from operations (STD_CASHFLOW), the standard deviation of revenues 
(STD_REV), the standard deviation of sales growth (STD_SALESGROWTH), and 
governance (G_INDEX), consistent with prior literature (Duellman et al., 2013; Jiang et 
al., 2010).    
To examine whether compensation committee co-option affects the committee’s 
effectiveness in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem, I 
estimate the regressions (5) and (6) using control variables consistent with Huson et al. 
(2012). 
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ΔlnCEO_COMPi,t = α + β1ΔROAi,t + β2ADJ_RETi,t + β3ΔRDi,t + 
β4HORIZONi,t + β5COOPTED_CCi,t + β6HORIZONi,t× 
ΔROAi,t + β7HORIZONi,t×ADJ_RETi,t + β8HORIZONi,t× 
∆RDi,t + β9 HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t + 
β10COOPTED_CCi,t×∆RDi,t + β 
11HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t×∆RDi,t + YEAR + εi,t         
   (5) 
Where ΔlnCEO_COMP is the change in natural logarithm of CEO compensation6. I use 
three measures of CEO compensation: ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm 
of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total 
compensation, which includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock 
grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option grants 
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of long-
term CEO compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of 
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-
adjusted stock return, which is calculated by subtracting the firm’s return by the market 
return for the corresponding market capitalization decile. ∆RD is the change in R&D 
expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to 
one if CEOs are in the final two years before retirement, and zero otherwise. 
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
                                                            
6 I only calculate the change in compensation for the same CEO.  
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committee directors are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. YEAR 
represents year indicators. 
ΔROA and ∆RD are both included to examine the different treatment of ∆RD 
compared to other earnings components. If ∆RD is treated the same way as other earnings 
components when there is no horizon problem, then the coefficient β3 on ∆RD should be 
insignificant, while a significant positive coefficient should indicate shielding of ∆RD 
from CEO compensation. The variable of interest is the interaction term between 
HORIZON, COOPTED_CC, and ∆RD. H3a predicts that compensation committees 
dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating opportunistic R&D 
reduction when CEOs approach retirement. Effective compensation committees can 
reduce the negative relationship between R&D expenditure and CEO compensation by 
shielding R&D from CEO compensation or tying CEO compensation to R&D. 
Nevertheless, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less 
effective in adjusting the negative relationship between R&D and CEO compensation. 
Therefore, when CEOs reduce R&D spending, they are more likely to increase their 
compensation prior to retirement. I expect the coefficient β11 to be negative, if H3a is 
correct.  
Consistent with prior studies (Murphy, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992), I expect 
CEO compensation to be positively associated with accounting performance (ΔROA) and 
stock performance (ADJ_RET). I include the interaction terms HORIZON×ΔROA and 
HORIZON×ADJ_RET because Lewellen et al. (1987) suggest the proportion of 
accounting-related compensation and stock-related compensation is adjusted to address 
CEO horizon problem. I expect the coefficient β6 on HORIZON× ΔROA to be negative 
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and β7 on HORIZON×ADJ_RET to be positive, which indicates CEO compensation shifts 
from accounting-based compensation to stock-based compensation to reduce the agency 
costs related to the CEO horizon problem. When ∆lnC_PAY is the dependent variable, I 
also control for CEO equity incentives (EQUITY_INCENTIVES), as CEO equity holdings 
may be one of the factors that compensation committees consider to determine CEO cash 
compensation (Huson et al., 2012).  
Hypothesis H3b predicts a more positive association between change in CEO 
compensation and a positive change in discretionary accruals when a compensation 
committee is dominated by co-opted directors. To test H3b, I estimate regression (6) as 
follows: 
ΔlnCEO_COMPi,t = α + β1ΔROAi,t + β2ADJ_RETi,t + β3POS_∆DAi,t + 
β4NEG_∆DAi,t + β5HORIZONi,t + β6COOPTED_CCi,t + 
β7HORIZONi,t×ΔROAi,t + β8HORIZONi,t×ADJ_RETi,t + 
β9HORIZONi,t×POS_∆DAi,t + β10HORIZONi,t× 
NEG_∆DAi,t + β11 HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t + 
β12COOPTED_CCi,t× POS_∆DAi,t + 
β13COOPTED_CCi,t× NEG_∆DAi,t + β 
14HORIZONi,t×COOPTED_CCi,t×POS_∆DAi,t + 
β15HORIZONi,t ×COOPTED_CCi,t×NEG_∆DAi,t + 
YEAR + εi,t                  (6) 
Where POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary accruals, and NEG_∆DA is the 
negative changes in discretionary accruals. My variable of interest is the interaction term 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA. I expect the coefficient to be positive, if H3b is 
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correct. My hypothesis only predicts that CEOs have incentives to engage in income-
increasing accruals management, and compensation committees dominated by co-opted 
directors are less effective to mitigate the income-increasing accruals management. 
Consequently, I focus on the positive change of discretionary accruals. I test the 
interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×NEG_∆DA for completeness. Nevertheless, 
I make no prediction about the sign of its coefficient.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Sample 
Table 1 Panel A presents the sample selection procedure. I collect director data 
from RiskMetrics for the period from 1998 to 2011. RiskMetrics provides director 
information, including committee membership, shareholding, age, independence, 
additional directorships, and tenure, as well as the year directorship starts for directors in 
S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap firms. I lose 2,445 firm-year observations as 
they lack CEO compensation data from Execucomp. I further lose 479 firm-year 
observations which miss the date when the CEO was hired. I exclude 2,788 financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) similar to prior studies. I exclude another 595 
observations that are missing Compustat inputs to calculate sales, return, and ROA, and 
352 observations lacking number of shares held by the CEO. Finally, I trim the top and 
bottom one percent of all continuous variables to mitigate the effect of outliers. My final 
sample consists of 13,606 firm-year observations7. 
                                                            
7 When estimating model (3)-(6), I further remove the firm-year observations with CEO tenure less than 3 
years, to avoid the influence of the previous CEO. 
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[See Table 1 Panel A, p.72] 
In Table 1 Panel B, I present the number of firm-year observations in each of 
Fama-French (1997) 48 industries as well as average value of two measures of 
compensation committee co-option in each industry. The percentage of co-opted directors 
sitting on a compensation committee is 0.278 for the industry of candy and soda, which is 
the lowest, while the industry of nonmetallic mines has the highest percentage of co-
opted directors on a compensation committee, which is as high as 0.649.  
[See Table 1 Panel B, p.72] 
In Table 1 Panel C, I provide the number of firm-year observations in each fiscal 
year for the period of 1998 to 2011 as well as average value of two measures of 
compensation committee co-option for each fiscal year. The mean value of the 
percentage of co-opted directors on a compensation committee varies by years. The 
lowest average value of CC_COOPTION is 0.394 in the year of 2001, while the highest 
average value of CC_COOPTION is 0.453 in the year of 2010.  
[See Table 1 Panel C, p.72] 
Table 1 Panel D displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in model 
(2), and are consistent with the descriptive statistics reported by Coles et al. (2014). 
Pearson correlations are reported in Table 1 Panel E. 
[See Table 1 Panel D, p.72] 
[See Table 1 Panel E, p.72] 
4.2 Regression Results 
Table 2 presents the multivariate analysis of the effect of compensation 
committees dominated by co-opted directors on total CEO compensation. The reported p-
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values presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted 
sign, and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the 
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered by firm 
and year. The coefficient on COOPTED_CC is significantly positive (p<0.01), which 
indicates that CEOs receive higher compensation in companies with compensation 
committees dominated by co-opted directors, holding all else constant. My findings 
support Hypothesis H1.  
[See Table 2, p.78] 
Among the control variables, firm size, firm performance, and CEO duality are 
positively associated with CEO compensation, while director ownership is negatively 
associated with CEO compensation, as expected. I do not find CEO tenure or board size 
to be associated with CEO compensation. 
[See Table 3, p.79] 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlations for the variables used in model (3), respectively. Table 4 reports the 
regression analysis of the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted 
directors on the association between R&D spending and the CEO horizon problem. The 
coefficient on HORIZON is not significantly different from zero, which is consistent with 
prior studies which state that R&D spending is not related to the CEO horizon problem 
(Cazier, 2011). However, the coefficient on the interaction term 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is significantly negative (p=0.03). Taken together, the 
results indicate that R&D reduction only exists in firms that have a CEO horizon problem 
46 
and a compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis H2a. 
[See Table 4, p.81] 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlations for the variables used in model (4), respectively. The regression analysis of 
the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors on the 
association between discretionary accruals management and the CEO horizon problem is 
presented in Table 6. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC 
is positive and significant (P=0.05). The coefficient on HORIZON is not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that CEOs engage in accruals management only when 
the horizon problem exists and when the compensation committee is dominated by co-
opted directors, which is consistent with Hypothesis H2b. 
[See Table 5, p.82] 
[See Table 6, p.84] 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 report the descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlations for the variables used in model (5), respectively. The estimates in Table 8 
show the multivariate regression results of whether compensation committees dominated 
by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to prevent 
opportunistic R&D reduction when firms face a CEO horizon problem. The first column 
shows the regression results when the change in CEO cash compensation is a dependent 
variable, while the results for the change in total CEO compensation and the change in 
long-term CEO compensation are presented in column (2) and column (3), respectively. 
In column (2), the coefficient on HORIZON×∆RD is significantly positive (p=0.09), 
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suggesting that R&D expenditures are generally shielded from total CEO compensation 
when firms have a CEO horizon problem. The coefficient on 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×∆RD is negative and significant (p=0.05). The negative 
association suggests that retiring CEOs in firms with a compensation committee 
dominated by co-opted directors are more likely to increase their compensation by 
reducing R&D expenditures.   
[See Table 7, p.85] 
[See Table 8, p.87] 
In Table 9, I present the OLS regression results of whether compensation 
committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO 
compensation in the final years prior to CEO retirement to prevent income-increasing 
accruals management. The coefficients on HORIZON×POS_∆DA are not significantly 
different from zero in all three columns. The coefficient on 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA is positive and significant (p=0.08) in column 
(1), indicating that change in CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with 
income-increasing discretionary accruals when CEOs present a horizon problem and 
compensation committees are dominated by co-opted directors.  
[See Table 9, p.88] 
Overall, my findings provide empirical support for Hypothesis H3a and 
Hypothesis H3. 
4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
As CEOs stay longer with a firm, more directors are appointed during the CEO’s 
tenure. Therefore, co-option captures the effect of CEO tenure. Coles et al. (2014) 
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address this issue by both controlling for CEO tenure and developing a measure 
RES_CC_COOPTION, which is the residual from regression of CC_COOPTION on 
CEO tenure. I follow their measure, and I control for CEO tenure and other board 
governance. Another issue with the co-option measure is that it may capture the 
inexperience of new directors. The newly appointed directors may be less effective 
because they are new to their job, rather than because they are captured by the CEO. 
Therefore, following Coles et al. (2014) I develop TW_CC_COOPTION, the director 
tenure weighted co-option, which is the sum of tenure of co-opted compensation 
committee directors divided by the sum of tenure of all compensation committee 
directors. I also calculate RES_TW_CC_COOPTION, which is the residual from the 
regression of TW_CC_COOPTION on CEO tenure.  
[See Table 10 Panel A, p.89] 
Table 10 Panel A reports the regression results of CEO compensation on the 
alternative measures of compensation committee co-option. The coefficient on 
CC_COOPTION is positive and significant (p<0.01) in column (1), suggesting that CEO 
compensation positively associates with the percentage of co-opted directors on a 
compensation committee. The coefficients on TW_CC_COOPTION, 
RES_CC_COOPTION, RES_TW_CC_COOPTION are all positive and significant 
(p<0.01). This significance suggests that compensation committee co-option captures 
more than CEO tenure and director inexperience. I also report the regression analysis of 
the effect of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors on adjusting a 
CEO’s opportunistic R&D reduction and accruals management, after controlling for other 
corporate governance in Table 10 Panel B and Table 10 Panel C, respectively. My 
49 
findings still hold after controlling for CEO tenure, CEO duality, board independence, 
and board size. 
[See Table 10 Panel B, p.89] 
[See Table 10 Panel C, p.89] 
Direct CEO involvement in the firm’s director nomination process has been 
reduced since 2004. NYSE Corporate Governance Section 303A, NASDAQ Rule 4350 
(c), and AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules, section 805 requires that 
nomination committees of listed firms must solely consist of independent directors. 
Therefore, I examine the subsample consisting of firm-year observations during the 
period 2004-2011. Panel D of Table 10 shows that CEO compensation is positively 
associated with compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors.  
[See Table 10 Panel D, p.89] 
Table 10 Panel E shows that the coefficient on interaction term 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is negative but insignificant. Table 10 Panel F reports that 
the coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×COOPTED_CC is significantly 
positive, suggesting discretionary accruals is higher in firms with retiring CEOs and 
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors.  
[See Table 10 Panel E, p.89] 
[See Table 10 Panel F, p.89] 
Table 10 Panel G shows that the coefficient on the interaction term 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×∆RD is insignificant in all three columns. Table 10 Panel H 
reports that the coefficient on the interaction term 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA is significantly positive in column (1), 
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suggesting that CEOs are more likely to increase their cash compensation using income-
increasing accruals management when compensation committees are dominated by co-
opted directors. Overall, I do not find evidence that compensation committees dominated 
by co-opted directors are less effective in alleviating R&D reduction when CEOs present 
their firms with a horizon problem in the subsample. However, I still find evidence that 
compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in reducing 
CEO compensation and mitigating accruals management when CEOs approach 
retirement after the year of 2004. 
[See Table 10 Panel G, p.89] 
[See Table 10 Panel H, p.89] 
 
5. BOARD AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS 
5.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
CEO Power 
CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of directors can exert more influence 
over the decision-making process (Adams et al., 2005). Jensen (1993) advocates the 
separation of the CEO and chairman positions, arguing that chairmen are responsible for 
overseeing CEOs, but if CEOs also hold the position of chairmen, they may act in their 
own interests when they perform critical functions such as evaluating and compensating 
themselves. Dechow et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence, and find that firms subject 
to enforcement actions by the SEC for earnings management are more likely to have 
CEOs who also serve as chairmen of the board of directors.  
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Director monitoring is a critical mechanism to alleviate agency costs; however, 
the effectiveness of the monitoring is reduced if the chairman of the board is assumed by 
the CEO, or if most of the directors on the board are co-opted by the incumbent CEO. 
Hence, I predict: 
H4a: CEO compensation is positively associated with CEO power. 
H4b: CEO horizon problem is positively associated with CEO power. 
Director Independence 
It’s been widely documented that directors who are more independent monitor 
managers more effectively. Weisbach (1988) shows that boards dominated by outside 
directors are more likely to remove CEOs when the companies suffer from poor 
performance. A number of studies show that board independence improves the quality of 
the financial reporting process. Dechow et al. (1996) find that board independence is 
inversely associated with the likelihood of being charged by SEC for earnings 
manipulations. Similarly, Beasley (1996) finds that board independence negatively 
associates with financial statement fraud. Uzun et al. (2004) compare the governance in 
firms that have committed fraud and those that have not. They note that the percentage of 
independent directors is higher in firms that have not engaged in fraud than the firms that 
have. Klein (2002a) documents a negative association between board independence and 
abnormal accruals. Board independence also improves firm disclosures (Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Finally, Byard et al. (2006) show that the quality of 
analysts’ earnings forecast an increase if the board is more independent.  
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If independent directors are more aligned with shareholder benefits, I expect that 
board and compensation committee independence reduce CEO pay and the CEO horizon 
problem. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H5a: CEO compensation is negatively associated with board and 
compensation committee independence. 
H5b: CEO horizon problem is negatively associated with board and 
compensation committee independence. 
Board and Compensation Committee Size 
A number of scholars have expressed their concern about large board sizes 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). For example, Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) suggest that board sizes should not be larger than ten members, since it is 
difficult for every director to express his or her opinion freely in the limited time when 
they meet. Moreover, they point out that it’s hard for a large board to become a cohesive 
body due to poor communication and lack of a common purpose. Jensen (1993) argues 
that boards that consist of more than seven or eight members are more subjective to CEO 
control. Those two studies are consistent with organizational behavior research studies, 
such as Steiner (1972) and Hackman (1990), which argue that as work groups become 
larger, productivity decreases. Yermack (1996) provides empirical evidence that board 
size negatively associates with a firm’s value. He also shows that firms with large boards 
are less likely to have favorable profitability and operating efficiency financial ratios, to 
provide CEO compensation sensitive to firm performance, and to remove CEOs.  
In contrast, larger boards have a wider knowledge base and it’s easier for larger 
boards to distribute the workload. For example, Klein (2002b) and Anderson et al. (2004) 
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suggest that large boards are more effective in monitoring the financial accounting 
process. Klein (2002b) suggests that as a board size increases, the board is more likely to 
assign an independent audit committee. Consistent with her prediction, she finds that as a 
board size increases, an audit committee’s independence increases. Anderson et al. (2004) 
find that larger boards are associated with lower cost of debt, while Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) find that larger boards are more likely to update management earnings 
forecasts. Laksmana (2008) finds that board size increases the executive compensation 
disclosure transparency.  
Whether a firm can benefit from a large board of directors may depend on the 
complexity of the firm (Coles et al., 2008). Coles et al. (2008) argue that complex firms, 
those high in industry diversification, size, and leverage, require more advising from their 
board of directors, and as a result can benefit from a large board. They find that for 
simple firms, firm value decreases as board size increases; however, for complex firms, 
firm value increases as board size increases. Drawing from the findings of previous 
studies, I predict that the size of the board and compensation committee affects CEO 
compensation and CEO horizon problem. Nevertheless, I make no prediction about the 
sign. I hypothesize that:  
 H6a: CEO compensation is associated with board and compensation 
committee size. 
H6b: CEO horizon problem is associated with board and compensation 
committee size. 
Busy Directors 
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The number of directorship may be a sign of director reputation, since an external 
labor market disciplines directors by rewarding or reducing directorships based on their 
performance (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Gilson, 1990). Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find 
that CEOs whose dividends are reduced are less likely to sit on other boards. Gilson 
(1990) finds that the directorships reduce after directors resign from financially distressed 
firms. Consistently, Ferris et al. (2003) find that previous firm performance has a positive 
effect on directors’ ability to attract directorships. Two studies examine the association 
between the likelihood of being a target of takeover and number of directorships 
(Shivdasani, 1993) and future directorships (Harford, 2003). Shivdasani (1993) 
documents that firms with outside directors holding fewer additional directorships are 
more likely to be a target of hostile takeover attempts. Harford (2003) documents that 
directors of a takeover or merger target lose future directorships. Ferris et al. (2003) find 
no support that busy directors are less effective monitors. They find no evidence that the 
number of directorships per director or number of directorships held by outside directors 
relate to firm value or the likelihood of securities fraud litigation. Moreover, they find 
positive abnormal returns in an event study that announced the addition of a director who 
held multiple directorships to the board for the first time, suggesting shareholders value 
the reputation of directors. They also find that directors holding multiple directorships sit 
on more committees and attend more committee meetings, which contrast the idea that 
directors holding multiple directorships are overcommitted and shirk their responsibilities.  
However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) are concerned that directors are busy with 
more than one board, and cannot emphasize one particular board. Beasley (1996) 
documents a positive relationship between the number of additional directorships held by 
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outside directors and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) define busy directors as those who hold three or more directorships. They show 
that firms with boards dominated by outside busy directors have lower market-to-book 
ratios, lower operating performance, and are less likely to remove CEOs for poor 
performance. They also find positive abnormal returns after busy outside directors 
announce their departure. Furthermore, they find negative abnormal returns when a 
director becomes a busy director as a result of obtaining one additional directorship, and 
even more negative when the board becomes dominated by busy directors. Core et al. 
(1999) measure busy directors as those who serve on three or more corporate boards. 
They argue that by focusing on directors who hold more than two other directorships 
rather than on those with average directorships, they can capture the degree of a 
director’s over-commitment. They find that as the percentage of busy outside directors 
increases, CEO compensation increases. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that if 
CEOs can exert more influence on the appointment of new directors positively, the 
appointee is more likely to be a busy director and hold more board seats, which indicates 
that CEOs prefer less effective monitors. If busy directors cannot devote adequate time 
and attention to one particular board, the percentage of busy directors on the board or 
compensation committee may increase CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem. 
Therefore, I predict: 
H7a: CEO compensation is positively associated with the percentage of 
busy directors on boards of directors and compensation committees. 
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H7b: The CEO horizon problem is positively associated with the 
percentage of busy directors on boards of directors and compensation 
committees. 
Director Tenure 
As director tenure increases, directors gain more experience. More experienced 
directors can provide higher quality governance. For example, Buchanan (1994) shows 
that managers’ years of organizational service can enhance their commitment to exert 
high levels of effort to achieve the goal of the firm. Beasley (1996) finds that as outside 
director tenure increases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. 
However, Katz (1982) finds that long tenure can be detrimental to the 
communication within and outside of organizations, due to the increasing stability in 
membership by studying R&D project groups with different group longevity. Vafeas 
(2003a) argues that directors with long tenure are more likely to be friendly to managers. 
He finds that senior directors who have held their board seats for twenty years or more in 
the compensation committee pay CEOs more generously, which supports the theory that 
long tenure compromises director monitoring efforts. The National Association of 
Corporate Directors (1996) advocates a limit of 10 to 15 years of board service so that 
new directors can bring new ideas and the board can better accommodate to the changing 
business conditions. If directors are more likely to be entrenched if they hold their 
directorships for a long time, I expect that the average tenure of directors on a board or a 
compensation committee increases CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem. I 
hypothesize that: 
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H8a: CEO compensation is positively associated with the tenure of 
directors on boards of directors and compensation committees. 
H8b: CEO horizon problem is positively associated with the tenure of 
directors on boards of directors and compensation committees. 
Director Ownership 
Directors who have high equity ownership have more incentives to monitor CEOs 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Among others, Shivdasani (1993), Vafeas (2003a), 
Klein (2002a), and Beasley (1996) provide evidence that directors with high ownership 
are more aligned with shareholders. Shivdasani (1993) documents a negative association 
between equity ownership by outside directors and the possibility of firms being a target 
of hostile takeover attempts. Vafeas (2003a) shows that director ownership is rather low, 
even for senior directors whose tenure is longer than twenty years. He finds a negative 
relationship between director ownership and total CEO pay. Klein (2002a) documents an 
inverse association between the presence of an outside blockholder on an audit committee 
and abnormal accruals, indicating that director ownership affects the monitoring over 
financial reporting quality. Beasley (1996) finds that directors in firms who commit fraud 
have higher ownership than directors in no-fraud firms. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
note that shareholders value the expertise of inside directors when they own more than 
five percent of the firm’s shares when investigating the stock market reaction to the 
addition of insiders in a board of directors. However, Core et al. (1999) find no empirical 
evidence that CEO compensation associates with director ownership. If director 
ownership enhances the alignment between directors and shareholders, I expect that as 
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director ownership increases, CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem 
decreases, holding all else constant. Hence: 
H9a: CEO compensation is negatively associated with the average tenure 
of directors on boards of directors and compensation committees. 
H9b: The CEO horizon problem is negatively associated with the average 
tenure of directors on boards of directors and compensation 
committees. 
5.2 Research Design 
Table 11 shows the Pearson correlations between the variables in this study to 
capture board and compensation committee characteristics. CC_COOPTION is the 
proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the 
compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed 
after the CEO assumes office on the board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are co-opted by 
the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the majority of directors on a board are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero 
otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman 
of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of 
outsiders on the board of directors. CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders 
on a compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm has a nominating committee that consists of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the 
number of directors on a compensation committee. B_SIZE is the number of directors on 
the board of directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that since the number of 
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directorships held by directors disperses widely, the average number of directorships is a 
noisy measure to identify busy directors. Therefore, I define busy directors as those who 
hold more than three additional directorships. B_BUSY is the proportion of board 
directors who sit on more than three other boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the 
proportion of compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards 
of public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on a board. 
CC_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on a compensation committee. 
CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on a compensation committee 
divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors 
on a board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the number of directors on 
board.  
[See Table 11, p.101] 
Most of those variables are correlated. Therefore, I use a principal component 
analysis to transform board and compensation committee characteristic variables into a 
set of common factors. Consistent with Laksmana (2002), I retain all factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than one. I use an oblique rotation since oblique rotation often 
produces more useful patterns than do orthogonal rotations. Six factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than one are retained and those six factors can explain 79.78% of the 
variation.  
Table 12 presents the factors identified in a principal components analysis. 
CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR 
have high loadings on the first factor CEO_POWER. B_INDEPENDENCE, 
CC_INDEPENDENCE and IND_NORM load highly on the second factor 
60 
INDEPENDENCE. Two variables, CC_SIZE and B_SIZE, have high loadings on the third 
factor DIR_SIZE. B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings on the fourth factor, 
BUSY_DIR. Two variables measuring director tenure, B_LONGSERV and 
CC_LONGSERV, load highly on the fifth factor, DIR_TENURE. CC_OWNERSHIP and 
B_OWERSHIP have high loadings on the sixth factor, DIR_OWNERSHIP.  
[See Table 12, p.103] 
5.3 Results 
Table 13 shows the regression results of CEO compensation on board and 
compensation committee factors. Consistent with the prediction of H4a and H7a, 
CEO_POWER (p<0.01) and BUSY_DIR (p<0.01) are positively associated with CEO 
compensation. In support of H9a, DIR_OWNERSHIP is negatively associated with CEO 
compensation (p<0.01). The coefficient on DIR_INDEPENDENCE, DIR_SIZE, and 
DIR_TENURE is not significantly different from zero.  
[See Table 13, p.104] 
The multivariate analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee 
factors on the association between R&D spending and the CEO horizon problem is 
presented in Table 14. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×CEO_POWER 
is negative and significant (p=0.03), suggesting that as CEO power increases, CEOs are 
more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when they approach retirement. The coefficient 
on the interaction term HORIZON×DIR_TENURE is significantly negative (p=0.02), 
which indicates that as the average tenure of directors on boards and compensation 
committees increases, retiring CEOs are more likely to cut R&D expenditures. The 
results provide support for H4b and H8b. Inconsistent with my prediction, the coefficient 
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on HORIZON×DIR_INDEPENDENCE, HORIZON×DIR_SIZE, HORIZON×BUSY_DIR, 
and HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP is insignificant.  
[See Table 14, p.105] 
Table 15 reports the regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation 
committee factors on the association between accruals management and the CEO horizon 
problem. The coefficient on the interaction term HORIZON×DIR_SIZE is negative and 
significant (p=0.02), which indicates that the size of the board and compensation 
committee affect the likelihood of accruals management when CEOs present their firms 
with a horizon problem. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on 
HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP is negative and marginally significant (p=0.10).  
[See Table 15, p.107] 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Directors who are co-opted by CEOs are more likely to be sympathetic to CEOs 
or less willing to challenge CEOs since they feel in debt to CEOs for their directorship. I 
find that the percentage of co-opted directors on compensation committees is positively 
associated with CEO compensation. I also find compensation committees that are 
dominated by co-opted directors tend to pay higher CEO compensation than committees 
that are not dominated by co-opted directors.  
Extant literature suggests that compensation committees play an important role in 
mitigating the CEO horizon problem. However, the effectiveness of compensation 
committees in this role varies. My results show that the percentage of co-opted directors 
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on a compensation committee has a negative effect on the association between R&D 
spending and the CEO horizon problem. Moreover, retiring CEOs are more likely to 
reduce R&D spending if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted directors. 
I do not find evidence that the percentage of co-opted directors affects the association 
between discretionary accruals and the CEO horizon problem. However, I find that CEOs 
are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals management in the final years 
prior to their retirement if the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted 
directors. Taken together, the findings indicate that a horizon problem exists when CEOs 
approach retirement and when the compensation committee is dominated by co-opted 
directors. 
I further investigate whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted 
directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon 
problem. Consistent with my prediction, I document that retiring CEOs are more likely to 
increase their total compensation by reducing R&D spending if compensation committees 
are dominated by co-opted directors. I also document that income-increasing accruals are 
more likely to be rewarded when CEOs approach retirement, and when compensation 
committees are dominated by co-opted directors. 
Finally, I examine whether board and compensation committee characteristics are 
associated with CEO compensation and the CEO horizon problem using a principal 
components analysis. I find evidence that CEO compensation is positively associated 
with CEO power and busy directors, while negatively associated with director ownership. 
In addition, I find that both CEO power and director tenure increases the likelihood of 
R&D curtailment when CEOs approach retirement. I also find that the size of the board 
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of directors and the compensation committee affect the likelihood of accruals 
management when CEOs present their firms with a horizon problem. 
This study contributes in three ways. First, it reveals that although CEOs’ direct 
involvement in the appointment process of new directors has been reduced since 2004, 
co-opted directors act as weak monitors. Second, the study adds empirical evidence to the 
debate of the CEO horizon problem, finding that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic 
R&D cutting and income-increasing accruals management. Third, the study extends the 
literature on corporate governance. The findings reveal that compensation committees 
play an important role in mitigating the CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO 
compensation. However, the effectiveness of compensation committees in this role is 
contingent on its quality.
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TABLE 1 Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
n 
Total firm-year observations in Riskmetrics for the period of 1998-2011 21,681 
Firm-year observations without CEO compensation data from Execucomp (2,445) 
Firm-year observations missing the date when CEO was hired (479) 
Firms in the financial service sector (2,788) 
Firm-year observations missing Compustat inputs to calculate sales, return, and 
ROA (595) 
Firm-year observations missing number of shares held by CEO (352) 
Firm-year observations at the top and bottom one percent of  all continuous 
variables (1,414) 
Final Sample   13,606 
This panel presents the information about the sample selection procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry Composition 
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Industry n 
The percentage of compensation committees 
dominated by co-opted directors 
Candy and Soda 29 0.241 
Electronic Equipment 366 0.268 
Electrical Equipment 184 0.359 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 61 0.295 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 991 0.315 
Textiles 84 0.345 
Consumer Goods 309 0.379 
Recreational Products 88 0.375 
Precious Metals 65 0.292 
Rubber and Plastic Products 93 0.441 
Tobacco Products 24 0.333 
Measuring and  
Control Equip 318 0.399 
Chemicals 485 0.419 
Entertainment 95 0.421 
Wholesale 1,009 0.408 
Printing and Publishing 125 0.456 
Miscellaneous 264 0.432 
Defense 22 0.500 
Agriculture 24 0.375 
Construction Materials 319 0.433 
Automobiles and Trucks 134 0.463 
Aircraft 30 0.700 
Business Services 485 0.487 
Transportation 545 0.448 
Food Products 314 0.468 
Computers 1,004 0.476 
Telecommunications 160 0.475 
Alcoholic Beverages 53 0.434 
Steel Works, Etc. 273 0.451 
Machinery 664 0.480 
Medical Equipment 428 0.477 
Coal 611 0.516 
Retail 337 0.475 
Utilities 256 0.449 
Pharmaceutical Products 519 0.511 
Business Supplies 78 0.449 
Personal Services 1,450 0.490 
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Shipping Containers 440 0.527 
Healthcare 266 0.526 
Trading 124 0.565 
Apparel 225 0.613 
Construction 194 0.644 
Fabricated Products 26 0.769 
Nonmetallic Mines 35 0.629 
This panel presents the number of firm-year observations in each of Fama-French (1997) 48 
industries and the percentage of compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors in 
each industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Fiscal Year Composition  
Fiscal Year n 
The percentage of compensation committees dominated 
by co-opted directors 
1998 927 0.436 
1999 907 0.436 
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2000 882 0.438 
2001 938 0.425 
2002 953 0.422 
2003 990 0.434 
2004 1,002 0.440 
2005 980 0.448 
2006 973 0.464 
2007 892 0.478 
2008 986 0.461 
2009 1,027 0.479 
2010 1,079 0.475 
2011 1,070 0.473 
This panel displays the number of firm-year observations and the percentage of compensation 
committees dominated by co-opted directors in each fiscal year between 1998 and 2011.  
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Panel D: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
lnT_PAY 13,606 7.99 0.94 7.31 8.00 8.65 
COOPTED_CC 13,606 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 13,606 7.45 1.40 6.46 7.35 8.40 
RET 13,606 0.05 0.41 -0.22 0.02 0.26 
ROA 13,606 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.19 
CEO_TENURE 13,606 6.74 6.99 2.00 5.00 9.00 
CEO_OWNERSHIP 13,606 15.54 36.89 0.94 2.90 10.03 
CEO_CHAIR 13,606 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 
B_INDEPENDENCE 13,606 0.72 0.16 0.63 0.75 0.86 
B_OWNERSHIP 13,606 63,423.10 93,799.10 8,777.73 25,292.56 73,053.44 
B_SIZE 13,606 9.10 2.40 7.00 9.00 11.00 
B_FEMALE 13,606 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
This panel displays the descriptive statistics. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total 
compensation. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option 
grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price 
Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before 
extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. 
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by the CEO. 
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on board of 
directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on 
the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to 
one if at least one of the directors on board is female, and zero otherwise.    
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Panel E: Pearson Correlations 
 lnT_PAY SIZE RET ROA CEO_TENURE 
CEO_OWNE
RSHIP 
B_INDEPEND
ENCE 
B_OWNER
SHIP B_SIZE 
SIZE 0.60 
RET 0.04 -0.02 
ROA 0.14 0.11 0.06 
CEO_TENURE -0.06 -0.10 -0.00 0.01 
CEO_OWNERSHIP -0.21 -0.15 0.00 0.06 0.39 
B_INDEPENDENCE 0.18 0.18 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.24 
B_OWNERSHIP -0.22 -0.18 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.47 -0.41 
B_SIZE 0.31 0.53 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.15 0.05 -0.04 
B_FEMALE 0.25 0.41 -0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.14 0.2 -0.14 0.47 
This panel displays the Pearson correlations. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation. CEO total compensation 
includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and 
value of option grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE 
is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO. B_INDEPENDENCE is the 
proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on 
the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the directors on the 
board is female, and zero otherwise. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface.   
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TABLE 2 Regression Results: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted 
directors on CEO compensation 
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 4.880 (<0.01) 
COOPTED_CC + 0.071 (<0.01) 
SIZE + 0.374 (<0.01) 
RET + 0.106 (<0.01) 
ROA + 1.132 (<0.01) 
CEO_TENURE + 0.001 (0.32) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP ? -0.003 (<0.01) 
CEO_CHAIR + 0.130 (<0.01) 
B_INDEPENDENCE ? 0.207 (<0.01) 
B_OWNERSHIP - -0.000 (<0.01) 
B_SIZE + 0.002 (0.32) 
B_FEMALE ? -0.036 (0.03) 
Observations 13,606 
R2   40.15% 
This table presents regression results for model (2). lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO 
total compensation. CEO total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, all other compensation, and value of option 
grants (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price 
Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before 
extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. 
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO. CEO_CHAIR 
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, and zero 
otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. 
B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors on the 
board.B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if 
at least one of the directors on the board is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are presented 
in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for 
those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report 
coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.  
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the R&D Test 
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
RD 5,599 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.07 
HORIZON 5,599 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COOPTED_CC 5,599 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TOBINS_Q 5,599 2.07 1.13 1.32 1.72 2.46 
LAG_RET 5,599 0.10 0.45 -0.21 0.05 0.31 
FCF 5,599 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.17 
ROA 5,599 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.19 
SIZE 5,599 7.29 1.43 6.22 7.12 8.23 
FIRM_AGE 5,599 26.15 16.64 12.00 20.00 41.00 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 5,599 629.56 1,288.63 88.13 227.47 605.18 
INDUSTRY_RD 5,599 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.12 0.20 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. 
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee 
directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON 
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their 
retirement, and zero otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the 
book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous 
year. FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled 
by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years 
between the current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as 
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry.  
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations               
RD TOBINS_Q LAG_RET FCF ROA SIZE FIRM_AGE EQUITY_INCENTIVES
TOBINS_Q 0.26 
LAG_RET 0.00 0.12 
FCF -0.43 0.17 0.03 
ROA 0.33 0.58 0.17 0.25 
SIZE -0.19 -0.08 -0.05 0.16 -0.07 
FIRM_AGE -0.19 -0.15 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 0.51 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 0.02 0.35 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.22 -0.05 
INDUSTRY_RD 0.31 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.15 0.01 0.08 -0.03 
This panel reports the Pearson correlations. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous year. FCF is the operating 
cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by 
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years between the 
current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% 
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 
2-digit SIC industry. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface.   
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TABLE 4 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are 
dominated by co-opted directors on the association between R&D spending and CEO 
horizon problem 
Dependent Variable = RD 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.028 (<0.01) 
HORIZON ? 0.003 (0.27) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.003 (<0.01) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC - -0.006 (0.03) 
TOBINS_Q + 0.005 (<0.01) 
LAG_RET + -0.007 (<0.01) 
FCF + -0.198 (<0.01) 
ROA - 0.187 (<0.01) 
SIZE ? 0.000 (0.80) 
FIRM_AGE - -0.000 (<0.01) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + -0.000 (0.30) 
INDUSTRY_RD + 0.064 (<0.01) 
Number of observations 5,599 
R2   47,33% 
The table presents OLS regression results for model (3). RD is the R&D expense scaled by total 
assets. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. 
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to 
their retirement, and zero otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus 
the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from 
previous year. FCF is the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all 
scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of 
years between the current year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as 
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-
tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted 
sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity 
robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates 
for year indicators. 
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TABLE 5 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the Discretionary Accruals 
Test 
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
DA 8,541 0.01 0.84 -0.07 0.01 0.12 
HORIZON 8,541 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COOPTED_CC 8,541 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 8,541 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.34 
SIZE 8,541 7.38 1.42 6.31 7.23 8.32 
STD_CASHFLOW 8,541 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 
STD_REV 8,541 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.18 
STD_SALESGROWTH 8,541 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.24 
OLDFIRM 8,541 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LEVERAGE 8,541 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.22 0.34 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics. DA is the discretionary accruals. COOPTED_CC is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are 
appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator 
variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero 
otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in 
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar 
change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the 
current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations deflated 
by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of 
sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is 
the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals 
one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is 
total liabilities deflated by total assets.  
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Panel B : Pearson Correlations 
DA EQUITY_INCENTIVES SIZE STD_CASHFLOW STD_REV STD_SALESGROWTH OLDFIRM
EQUITY_INCENTIVES -0.01 
SIZE 0.02 0.04 
STD_CASHFLOW -0.02 -0.01 -0.31 
STD_REV 0.01 -0.02 -0.19 0.36 
STD_SALESGROWTH 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.27 0.24 
OLDFIRM 0.03 -0.15 0.36 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14 
LEVERAGE 0.02 -0.2 0.38 -0.19 -0.07 0.05 0.18 
This panel presents the Pearson correlations. DA is the discretionary accruals. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's 
wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary 
and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales 
deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the 
current and previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. 
LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface. Correlations 
with p-values equal to or lower than 0.05 are in boldface. 
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TABLE 6 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are 
dominated by co-opted directors on the association between discretionary accruals and 
CEO horizon problem 
Dependent Variable = DA 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.213 (0.06) 
HORIZON + -0.041 (0.38) 
COOPTED_CC ? -0.053 (0.01) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC + 0.103 (0.05) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + 0.048 (0.17) 
SIZE - -0.006 (0.23) 
STD_CASHFLOW ? -0.807 (0.06) 
STD_REV ? 0.147 (0.18) 
STD_SALESGROWTH ? -0.005 (0.94) 
OLDFIRM ? 0.022 (0.33) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.001 (0.99) 
MARKETTOBOOK ? -0.005 (0.29) 
Number of observations 8,541 
R2   4.66% 
The table presents OLS regression results for model (4). DA is the discretionary accruals. 
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee 
directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. HORIZON 
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their 
retirement, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's wealth from 
a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of 
the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning 
of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations 
deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. STD_REV is the standard 
deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. 
STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous 
four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and 
zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. MARKETTOBOOK 
represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of assets ranked within 
each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have 
the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the 
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For 
the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators, G_index indicators, 
exchange indicators and industry indicators. 
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TABLE 7 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for the Change in CEO 
Compensation Test 
Panel A : Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
∆lnC_PAY 8,950 -0.02 0.33 -0.08 0.01 0.11 
∆lnT_PAY 8,889 0.05 0.75 -0.20 0.04 0.32 
∆lnL_PAY 8,763 0.19 3.27 -0.29 0.07 0.51 
∆ROA 8,950 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
ADJ_RET 8,950 -0.01 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 
POS_∆DA 8,950 0.33 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.16 
NEG_∆DA 8,950 -0.35 0.98 -0.17 -0.00 0.00 
HORIZON 8,950 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COOPTED_CC 8,950 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 8,950 601.68 1168.79 79.31 212.20 559.31 
∆RD 5,380 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
This panel presents the descriptive statistics. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of 
CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total 
compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of 
CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of 
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 
2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary 
items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. 
POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in 
discretionary accruals. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the 
final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar 
wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). ∆RD is 
the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
∆lnC_PAY ∆lnT_PAY ∆lnL_PAY ∆ROA ADJ_RET 
∆lnT_PAY 0.2 
∆lnL_PAY -0.00 0.5 
∆ROA 0.19 0.14 0.04 
ADJ_RET 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 
This panel presents the Pearson correlations. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of 
CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total 
compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of 
CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of 
option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 
2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary 
items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as 
measured in Core and Guay (2002).  
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TABLE 8 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are 
dominated by co-opted directors and whether CEOs are approaching retirements on the 
association between the change in CEO compensation and the change in R&D 
Dependent Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -0.016 (0.08) -0.001 (0.97) -0.019 (0.78) 
∆ROA + 1.034 (<0.01) 1.574 (<0.01) 1.627 (0.03) 
ADJ_RET + 0.125 (0.01) 0.293 (0.02) 0.519 (0.14) 
∆RD ? 0.073 (0.85) 0.383 (0.68) 1.814 (0.67) 
HORIZON ? 0.029 (0.25) -0.074 (0.16) -0.571 (0.07) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.004 (0.67) 0.007 (0.75) 0.006 (0.95) 
HORIZON×∆ROA - 0.353 (0.24) -0.067 (0.46) 2.638 (0.54) 
HORIZON×RET + -0.030 (0.84) -0.377 (0.30) -0.661 (0.84) 
HORIZON×∆RD ? -2.440 (0.21) 5.447 (0.09) -5.988 (0.65) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_
CC ? -0.028 (0.39)  0.031 (0.64)  0.730 (0.08) 
COOPTED_CC×∆RD ? 0.770 (0.10) 0.367 (0.79) -1.347 (0.79) 
HORIZON×COOPTED
_CC×∆RD - 1.314 (0.57)  -6.880 (0.05)  -22.84 (0.30) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES ? 0.000 (0.60) 
No. of observations 5,380 5,354 5,277 
R2   17.44%  2.76%   1.01% 
The table presents OLS regression results for model (5). ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural 
logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO 
total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural 
logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, 
value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are 
adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted 
stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is 
an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their 
retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes 
office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% 
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in 
parentheses and are two-tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by 
firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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TABLE 9 Regression Results: The effect of whether compensation committees are 
dominated by co-opted directors and whether CEOs are approaching retirements on the 
association between the change in CEO compensation and the change in discretionary 
accruals 
Dependent Variable 
 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -0.009 (0.25) 0.022 (0.27) 0.034 (0.66) 
∆ROA + 1.015 (<0.01) 1.621 (<0.01) 1.886 (<0.01) 
ADJ_RET + 0.184 (<0.01) 0.326 (<0.01) 0.905 (0.02) 
POS_∆DA ? 0.000 (0.98) -0.019 (0.19) 0.058 (0.64) 
NEG_∆DA ? 0.015 (0.01) -0.005 (0.71) -0.018 (0.73) 
HORIZON ? 0.043 (0.06) -0.035 (0.40) -0.291 (0.03) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.008 (0.33) 0.008 (0.63) 0.037 (0.66) 
HORIZON×∆ROA - 0.047 (0.86) -0.177 (0.36) 2.279 (0.23) 
HORIZON×RET + -0.024 (0.85) -0.255 (0.34) -0.426 (0.84) 
HORIZON×POS_∆DA ? -0.002 (0.88) -0.051 (0.22) -0.838 (0.23) 
HORIZON×NEG_∆DA ? 0.016 (0.50) 0.028 (0.40) -0.059 (0.61) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC ? -0.066 (0.02) -0.006 (0.91) 0.249 (0.28) 
COOPTED_CC×POS_∆DA ? -0.005 (0.47) -0.002 (0.93) -0.080 (0.53) 
COOPTED_CC×NEG_∆DA ? -0.016 (0.02) 0.005 (0.77) 0.014 (0.85) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
×POS_∆DA + 0.034 (0.08)  0.040 (0.24)  0.883 (0.11) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC
×NEG_∆DA ? -0.017 (0.53)  -0.018 (0.69)  0.141 (0.40) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES ? -0.000 (0.98) 
No. of observations 8,950 8,889 8,763 
R2   16.28%  2.98%   0.97% 
The table presents regression results for model (6). ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural 
logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO 
total compensation. ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term 
compensation. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total 
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive 
changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals. 
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to 
their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes 
office, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% 
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in 
parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for 
those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report 
coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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TABLE 10 Robustness Tests 
Panel A: CEO compensation regressed on the alternative measures of compensation 
committee co-option 
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY 
 
Compensation committee co-option measures 
Variable CC_COOPTION(1) 
TW_CC_COO
PTION(2) 
RES_CC_COOP
TION(3) 
RES_TW_CC_
COOPTION(4) 
Intercept 4.872 4.881 4.894 4.890 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Co-option measures + 0.128 0.124 0.128 0.124 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
SIZE + 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
RET + 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
ROA + 1.134 1.136 1.134 1.136 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.004 
(0.71) (0.83) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
CEO_CHAIR + 0.127 0.128 0.127 0.128 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
B_INDEPENDENCE ? 0.202 0.204 0.202 0.204 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
B_OWNERSHIP - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
B_SIZE + 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
(0.28) (0.23) (0.28) (0.23) 
B_FEMALE ? -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 13,606 13,598 13,606 13,598 
R2   40.20% 40.18% 40.20% 40.18% 
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The table reports regression results for model (2) using alternative measures of compensation 
committee co-option. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation 
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). CC_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are 
appointed after the CEO assumes office on the compensation committee. TW_CC_COOPTION 
is the director tenure weighted co-option, which is the sum of tenure of co-opted Compensation 
Committee directors divided by the sum of tenure of all compensation committee directors. 
RES_CC_COOPTION is the residual from regression of CC_COOPTION on CEO tenure. 
RES_TW_CC_COOPTION is the residual from the regression of TW_CC_COOPTION on CEO 
tenure. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings 
before extraordinary item divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. 
CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by CEO. 
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board 
of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares held by directors 
on the board B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal 
to one if at least one of the directors on the board is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are 
presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-
tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, 
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.  
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Panel B: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on 
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate R&D reduction after controlling for other 
corporate governance 
Dependent Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept 0.010 (0.80) 0.065 (0.41) -0.067 (0.93) 
∆ROA + 1.031 (<0.01) 1.572 (<0.01) 1.604 (0.03) 
ADJ_RET + 0.126 (0.01) 0.295 (0.02) 0.533 (0.13) 
∆RD ? 0.026 (0.95) 0.262 (0.78) 1.270 (0.76) 
HORIZON ? 0.031 (0.22) -0.063 (0.22) -0.554 (0.08) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.003 (0.81) 0.029 (0.30) -0.019 (0.85) 
HORIZON×∆ROA - 0.351 (0.24) -0.068 (0.46) 2.632 (0.54) 
HORIZON×ADJ_RET + -0.037 (0.81) -0.384 (0.29) -0.745 (0.82) 
HORIZON×∆RD ? -2.365 (0.23) 5.490 (0.09) -4.531 (0.73) 
HORIZON×COOPTE
D_CC ? -0.027 (0.40)  0.031 (0.64)  0.742 (0.07) 
COOPTED_CC×∆RD ? 0.784 (0.10) 0.459 (0.74) -1.148 (0.82) 
HORIZON×COOPTE
D_CC×∆RD - 1.275 (0.59)  -6.717 (0.05)  -24.179 (0.28) 
lnCEO_TENURE ? -0.000 (0.99) -0.033 (0.09) 0.009 (0.92) 
CEO_CHAIR ? -0.007 (0.48) -0.024 (0.41) -0.045 (0.66) 
B_INDDIR ? 0.025 (0.62) 0.075 (0.49) 0.683 (0.44) 
lnB_SIZE ? -0.022 (0.20) -0.034 (0.41) -0.283 (0.17) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVE
S ? 0.000 (0.48)       
No. of observations 5,380 5,354 5,277 
R2   17.49%  2.84%   1.07% 
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The table reports regression results for model (5) after controlling for other corporate governance. 
∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the 
change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). 
∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined 
as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All 
the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is 
the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the 
firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D expenditures, scaled by 
lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the 
final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. lnCEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of 
CEO tenure. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the 
board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDDIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
board of directors solely consists of outsiders, and zero otherwise. lnB_SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of number of directors on the board. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth 
increase from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values 
are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and 
two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, 
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
93 
Panel C: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on 
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate income-increasing accruals management after 
controlling for other corporate governance 
Dependent Variable 
 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept 0.031 (0.33) 0.064 (0.32) -0.252 (0.64) 
∆ROA + 1.012 (<0.01) 1.620 (<0.01) 1.879 (<0.01) 
ADJ_RET + 0.184 (<0.01) 0.330 (<0.01) 0.939 (0.02) 
POS_∆DA ? -0.000 (0.96) -0.019 (0.18) 0.054 (0.66) 
NEG_∆DA ? 0.015 (0.01) -0.005 (0.73) -0.014 (0.78) 
HORIZON ? 0.046 (0.04) -0.027 (0.52) -0.271 (0.04) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.009 (0.29) 0.030 (0.14) 0.056 (0.54) 
HORIZON×∆ROA - 0.045 (0.86) -0.165 (0.37) 2.273 (0.46) 
HORIZON×RET + -0.030 (0.81) -0.258 (0.34) -0.472 (0.83) 
HORIZON×POS_∆DA ? -0.002 (0.89) -0.050 (0.23) -0.837 (0.23) 
HORIZON×NEG_∆DA ? 0.016 (0.51) 0.028 (0.40) -0.069 (0.55) 
HORIZON×COOPTED
_CC ? -0.065 (0.02)  -0.002 (0.97)  0.276 (0.23) 
COOPTED_CC×POS_
∆DA ? -0.005 (0.48)  -0.001 (0.96)  -0.080 (0.53) 
COOPTED_CC×NEG_
∆DA ? -0.016 (0.02)  0.005 (0.77)  0.015 (0.84) 
HORIZON×COOPTE
D_CC×POS_∆DA + 0.034 (0.08)  0.042 (0.23)  0.885 (0.11) 
HORIZON×COOPTED
_CC×NEG_∆DA ? -0.017 (0.54)  -0.017 (0.71)  0.156 (0.35) 
lnCEO_TENURE ? 0.000 (0.71) -0.035 (0.01) -0.060 (0.41) 
CEO_CHAIR ? -0.006 (0.35) -0.014 (0.48) -0.013 (0.85) 
B_INDDIR ? -0.006 (0.44) 0.101 (0.23) 1.034 (0.10) 
lnB_SIZE ? 0.040 (0.31) -0.036 (0.23) -0.288 (0.05) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES ? -0.031 (0.02) 
No. of observations 8,950 8,889 8,763 
R2   16.36%  3.07%   1.05% 
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The table presents OLS regression results for equation (6) after controlling for other corporate 
governance. ∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. 
∆lnT_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data 
item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, 
which is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term 
incentive payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer 
Price Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total 
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive 
changes in discretionary accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals. 
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to 
their retirement, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes 
office, and zero otherwise. lnCEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of CEO tenure. 
CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDDIR is an indicator variable equal to one if the board of 
directors solely consists of outsiders, and zero otherwise. lnB_SIZE is the natural logarithm of a 
number of directors on the board. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase 
from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are 
presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-
tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not 
report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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Panel D: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on CEO 
compensation for the subsample of 2004-2011 
Dependent Variable = lnT_PAY 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 4.696 (<0.01) 
COOPTED_CC + 0.067 (<0.01) 
SIZE + 0.373 (<0.01) 
RET + 0.146 (<0.01) 
ROA + 0.998 (<0.01) 
CEO_TENURE + 0.001 (0.41) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP ? -0.003 (<0.01) 
CEO_CHAIR + 0.112 (<0.01) 
B_INDEPENDENCE ? 0.515 (<0.01) 
B_OWNERSHIP - 0.000 (<0.01) 
B_SIZE + 0.012 (0.01) 
B_FEMALE ? -0.009 (0.65) 
Observations 6,618 
R2   46.26% 
This table presents regression results of model (2) for the subsample of 2004-2011. lnT_PAY is 
the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is 
adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales. RET 
is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item divided by total assets. 
CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the firm's 
outstanding shares held by CEO. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is 
the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the 
proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. B_OWNERSHIP is the proportion of the 
firm's outstanding shares held by directors on the board. B_SIZE is the number of directors on 
the board. B_FEMALE is an indicator equal to one if at least one of the directors on the board 
is female, and zero otherwise. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for 
coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or 
those that do not have the predicted sign.  The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, 
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for 
year indicators and G index dummies.  
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Panel E: The effect of whether compensation committees are dominated by co-opted 
directors on the association between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem for the 
subsample of 2004-2011 
Dependent Variable = RD 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.034 (<0.01) 
HORIZON ? 0.003 (0.39) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.004 (<0.01) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC - -0.004 (0.19) 
TOBINS_Q + 0.002 (0.07) 
LAG_RET + -0.004 (0.03) 
FCF + -0.213 (<0.01) 
ROA - 0.237 (<0.01) 
SIZE ? -0.001 (0.27) 
FIRM_AGE - 0.000 (<0.01) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + 0.000 (0.15) 
INDUSTRY_RD + 0.049 (<0.01) 
Number of observations 3,580 
R2   49.40% 
The table presents OLS regressions results of model (3) for the subsample of 2004-2011. 
RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO assumes, and zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal 
to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero 
otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the stock return from previous year. FCF is 
the operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by 
sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the 
number of years between the current year and the first year the company listed on 
Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% 
change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the 
average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values 
are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for coefficients that have the predicted 
sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or those that do not have the 
predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and 
year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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Panel F: The effect of whether compensation committees are dominated by co-opted 
directors on the association between discretionary accruals and CEO horizon problem for 
the subsample of 2004-2011 
Dependent Variable = DA 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.029 (0.85) 
HORIZON + -0.066 (0.42) 
COOPTED_CC ? -0.059 (0.04) 
HORIZON×COOPTED_CC + 0.165 (0.05) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + 0.035 (0.31) 
SIZE - -0.005 (0.34) 
STD_CASHFLOW ? -0.755 (0.27) 
STD_REV ? 0.209 (0.21) 
STD_SALESGROWTH ? 0.221 (0.05) 
OLDFIRM ? 0.036 (0.25) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.007 (0.95) 
MARKETTOBOOK ? -0.004 (0.55) 
Number of observations 5,248 
R2 5.34% 
The table presents OLS regressions results of model (4) for the subsample of 2004-2011. DA is 
the discretionary accruals. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of 
compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and 
zero otherwise. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final 
two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar 
change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), 
then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation 
of cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. 
STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous 
four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and 
previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 
years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. 
MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets ranked within each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed for 
coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or 
those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, 
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for 
year indicators, G_index indicators, exchange indicators and industry indicators. 
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Panel G Regression Results: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-
opted directors on adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate R&D reduction for the 
subsample of 2004-2011 
Dependent Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -0.015 (0.11) -0.014 (0.57) -0.037 (0.57) 
∆ROA + 0.521 (<0.01) 1.642 (<0.01) 1.536 (0.05) 
ADJ_RET + 0.043 (0.23) 0.056 (0.39) 0.534 (0.14) 
∆RD ? 0.013 (0.98) 1.501 (0.20) 7.097 (0.23) 
HORIZON ? 0.051 (0.14) -0.076 (0.25) -0.708 (0.18) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.017 (0.10) 0.012 (0.64) 0.028 (0.76) 
HORIZON×∆ROA - 0.171 (0.62) -0.468 (0.23) 4.580 (0.52) 
HORIZON×RET + 0.205 (0.19) 0.199 (0.33) -6.871 (0.12) 
HORIZON×∆RD ? -4.445 (0.09) -1.867 (0.73) -71.730 (0.17) 
HORIZON×COOP
TED_CC ? -0.047 (0.28)  0.005 (0.95)  0.797 (0.20) 
COOPTED_CC×∆
RD ? 0.309 (0.62)  0.553 (0.71)  -7.901 (0.22) 
HORIZON×COOP
TED_CC×∆RD - 3.954 (0.19)  0.162 (0.98)  23.745 (0.78) 
EQUITY_INCENTI
VES ? 0.000 (0.57)       
No. of observations 3,450 3,435 3,409 
R2   20.59%  2.66%   1.80% 
The table presents OLS regressions results of equation (5) for the subsample of 2004-2011. 
∆lnC_PAY is the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the 
change in the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). 
∆lnL_PAY is the change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is 
defined as the sum of restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive 
payouts. All the compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price 
Index. ∆ROA is the change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total 
assets. ADJ_RET is the firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. ∆RD is the change in R&D 
expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if 
CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. 
COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero 
otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in 
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in parentheses 
and are two-tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and 
year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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Panel H: The effect of compensation committee dominated by co-opted directors on 
adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate income-increasing accruals management for the 
subsample of 2004-2011 
Dependent Variable 
Pred. Sign 
∆lnC_PAY (1) ∆lnT_PAY (2) ∆lnL_PAY (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -0.011 (0.18) 0.017 (0.40) 0.028 (0.70) 
∆ROA + 0.563 (<0.01) 1.495 (<0.01) 1.962 (<0.01) 
ADJ_RET + 0.073 (0.06) 0.173 (0.12) 1.006 (0.02) 
POS_∆DA ? 0.002 (0.73) -0.024 (0.11) 0.058 (0.67) 
NEG_∆DA ? 0.015 (0.01) -0.006 (0.64) -0.076 (0.11) 
HORIZON ? 0.071 (0.04) -0.054 (0.30) -0.334 (0.06) 
COOPTED_CC ? 0.019 (0.03) 0.019 (0.31) 0.036 (0.65) 
HORIZON×∆R
OA - -0.180 (0.27)  -0.479 (0.19)  2.150 (0.65) 
HORIZON×RET + 0.252 (0.12) 0.090 (0.40) -4.157 (0.09) 
HORIZON×POS
_∆DA ? -0.009 (0.59)  -0.051 (0.23)  -0.886 (0.24) 
HORIZON×NE
G_∆DA ? 0.011 (0.71)  0.025 (0.49)  0.016 (0.90) 
HORIZON×CO
OPTED_CC ? -0.111 (0.01)  -0.029 (0.64)  0.177 (0.58) 
COOPTED_CC
×POS_∆DA ? -0.009 (0.22)  0.002 (0.92)  -0.069 (0.63) 
COOPTED_CC
×NEG_∆DA ? -0.016 (0.03)  0.013 (0.46)  0.076 (0.28) 
HORIZON×CO
OPTED_CC×P
OS_∆DA 
+ 0.043 (0.04)  0.029 (0.30)  0.861 (0.12) 
HORIZON×CO
OPTED_CC×N
EG_∆DA 
? -0.027 (0.40)  -0.028 (0.59)  0.058 (0.77) 
EQUITY_INCE
NTIVES ? 0.000 (0.41)       
No. of 
observations  5,614  5,579  5,524 
R2   21.05%  2.78%   1.14% 
The table presents OLS regression results of model (6) for the sample of 2004-2011. ∆lnC_PAY is 
the change in the natural logarithm of CEO salary and bonus. ∆lnT_PAY is the change in the 
natural logarithm of CEO total compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). ∆lnL_PAY is the 
change in natural logarithm of CEO long-term compensation, which is defined as the sum of 
restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and long-term incentive payouts. All the 
compensation measures are adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. ∆ROA is the 
change in earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged total assets. ADJ_RET is the 
firm’s annual size-adjusted stock return. POS_∆DA is the positive changes in discretionary 
accruals. NEG_∆DA is the negative changes in discretionary accruals. HORIZON is an indicator 
variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to their retirement, and zero 
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otherwise. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation 
committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as 
measured in Core and Guay (2002). The p-values are presented in parentheses and are one-tailed 
for coefficients that have the predicted sign and two-tailed for those without a predicted sign or 
those that do not have the predicted sign. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, 
clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year 
indicators. 
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TABLE 11 Pearson Correlations between the Board and Compensation Committee Characteristics Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.B_INDEPENDENCE 1 
2.CC_INDEPENDENCE 0.57 
3.B_COOPTION -0.01 -0.01 
4.CC_COOPTION -0.03 0.02 0.91 
5.B_LONGSERV -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
6.CC_LONGSERV -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.69 
7.B_SIZE 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
8.CC_SIZE 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.99 
9.B_OWNERSHIP -0.24 -0.14 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
10.CC_OWNERSHIP -0.13 -0.21 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.66 
11.B_BUSY 0.12 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.02
12.CC_BUSY 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.79 
13.CEO_CHAIR 0.01 -0.03 0.19 0.17 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.08 
14.IND_NORM 0.51 0.42 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 -0.00 -0.04
15.COOPTED_CC -0.02 0.02 0.80 0.90 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.15 -0.00
16.COOPTED_B -0.01 -0.01 0.87 0.81 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 -0.02 0.77 
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This panel displays the Pearson correlations between the board and compensation committee characteristics variables. Correlations significant 
at the 5% level or less appear in bold. CC_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the 
compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the board of 
directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of directors on the 
board are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is 
the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. 
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm has a nominating committee that consists of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on the compensation committee. 
B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board directors who sit on more than three other 
boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards of 
public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the 
compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the compensation committee divided by total outstanding 
shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the number of 
directors on the board. 
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TABLE 12 Factors Identified in Principal Components Analysis 
Factor  Factor Name 
Board and Compensation Committee 
characteristics 
Factor 
Loadings 
1 CEO_POWER CC_COOPTION 0.959 
B_COOPTION 0.951 
COOPTED_CC 0.919 
COOPTED_B 0.916 
CEO_CHAIR 0.269 
2 INDEPENDENCE B_INDEPENDENCE 0.848 
CC_INDEPENDENCE 0.794 
IND_NORM 0.793 
3 DIR_SIZE CC_SIZE 0.996 
B_SIZE 0.996 
4 BUSY_DIR B_BUSY 0.936 
CC_BUSY 0.93 
5 DIR_TENURE B_LONGSERV 0.919 
CC_LONGSERV 0.918 
6 DIR_OWNERSHIP CC_OWNERSHIP 0.909 
      B_OWNERSHIP 0.896 
This table presents the 6 factors identified in Principal Components Analysis. CC_COOPTION is 
the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the compensation 
committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes 
office on the board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority 
of compensation committee directors are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and 
zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of directors on 
the board are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR 
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, and zero 
otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors. 
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the compensation committee. IND_NORM 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a nominating committee that consists of only 
outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on the compensation committee. B_SIZE is 
the number of directors on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board directors who 
sit on more than three other boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of 
compensation committee directors who sit on more than three other boards of public companies. 
B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average 
tenure of directors on the compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by 
directors on the compensation committee divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is 
the total shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding shares. B_SIZE is the 
number of directors on the board.  
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TABLE 13 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on 
CEO compensation 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 5.220 (<0.01) 
CEO_POWER + 0.083 (<0.01) 
DIR_INDEPENDENCE - 0.013 (0.14) 
DIR_SIZE ? -0.071 (0.20) 
BUSY_DIR + 0.081 (<0.01) 
DIR_TENURE + 0.000 (0.49) 
DIR_OWNERSHIP - -0.091 (<0.01) 
SIZE + 0.366 (<0.01) 
RET + 0.109 (<0.01) 
ROA + 1.139 (<0.01) 
CEO_TENURE + -0.002 (0.28) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP ? -0.003 (<0.01) 
Observations 13,585 
R2 40.47% 
The table presents regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors 
on CEO compensation. lnT_PAY is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation 
(EXECUCOMP data item TDC1). It is adjusted to 2003 dollars using Consumer Price Index. 
CEO_POWER is the factor on which CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, 
COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on 
which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high loadings. 
DIR_SIZE is the factor on which CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the 
factor on which B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings. DIR_TENURE is the factor on 
which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor 
on which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of sales. RET is the firm’s stock return. ROA is the earnings before extraordinary item 
divided by total assets. CEO_TENURE is the CEO tenure. CEO_OWNERSHIP is the proportion 
of outstanding shares held by CEO. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-tailed. 
The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of 
brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators and G index dummies.  
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TABLE 14 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on 
the association between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.017 (<0.01) 
HORIZON ? 0.001 (0.60) 
CEO_POWER ? 0.002 (0.00) 
DIR_INDEPENDENCE ? 0.003 (<0.01) 
DIR_SIZE ? -0.051 (<0.01) 
BUSY_DIR ? 0.002 (0.01) 
DIR_TENURE ? 0.003 (0.27) 
DIR_OWNERSHIP ? -0.002 (0.01) 
HORIZON×CEO_POWER - -0.003 (0.03) 
HORIZON×DIR_INDEPENDE
NCE + -0.001 (0.46) 
HORIZON×DIR_SIZE ? 0.016 (0.18) 
HORIZON×BUSY_DIR - -0.001 (0.25) 
HORIZON×DIR_TENURE - -0.015 (0.02) 
HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHIP + -0.001 (0.20) 
TOBINS_Q + 0.005 (<0.01) 
LAG_RET + -0.007 (<0.01) 
FCF + -0.193 (<0.01) 
ROA - 0.184 (<0.01) 
SIZE ? 0.001 (0.06) 
FIRM_AGE - -0.000 (<0.01) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + -0.001 (0.46) 
INDUSTRY_RD + 0.064 (<0.01) 
Number of observations 5,589 
R2 49.07% 
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The table presents the regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee 
factors on mitigating opportunistic R&D reduction. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. 
HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are in each of the final two years prior to 
their retirement, and zero otherwise. CEO_POWER is the factor on which CC_COOPTION, 
B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high loadings. 
DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and 
IND_NORM have high loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have 
high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings. 
DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. 
DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high 
loadings. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, all 
scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm’s stock return from previous year. FCF is the 
operating cash flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is 
operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years between year t and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES 
is the natural logarithm of the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as 
measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-
tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake 
of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators. 
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TABLE 15 Regression Results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on 
the association between discretionary accruals and CEO horizon problem 
Variable Predicted Sign  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.212 (0.08) 
HORIZON ? 0.012 (0.71) 
CEO_POWER ? -0.019 (0.08) 
DIR_INDEPENDENCE ? -0.011 (0.36) 
DIR_SIZE ? 0.130 (0.08) 
BUSY_DIR ? -0.005 (0.61) 
DIR_TENURE ? 0.002 (0.42) 
DIR_OWNERSHIP ? -0.003 (0.39) 
HORIZON×CEO_POWER + 0.018 (0.30) 
HORIZON×DIR_INDEPEND
ENCE - 0.018 (0.61) 
HORIZON×DIR_SIZE ? -0.439 (0.02) 
HORIZON×BUSY_DIR + 0.017 (0.28) 
HORIZON×DIR_TENURE + -0.192 (0.14) 
HORIZON×DIR_OWNERSHI
P - 0.023 (0.10) 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + 0.047 (0.35) 
SIZE - -0.008 (0.40) 
STD_CASHFLOW ? -0.793 (0.07) 
STD_REV ? 0.141 (0.20) 
STD_SALESGROWTH ? -0.008 (0.90) 
OLDFIRM ? 0.019 (0.42) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.002 (0.97) 
MARKETTOBOOK ? -0.005 (0.32) 
Number of observations 8,526 
R2 4.72% 
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The table reports regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors 
on mitigating opportunistic accruals management. CEO_POWER is the factor on which 
CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high 
loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE, 
CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which 
CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and 
CC_BUSY have high loadings. DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and 
CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on which 
CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar 
change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), 
then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous four years. 
STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous 
four years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and 
previous four years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 
years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. 
MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets ranked within each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-tailed.  The 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, 
we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators, G_index indicators, exchange 
indicators, and industry indicators. 
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